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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 18, 1995, Governor Lawton Chiles signed into law land-
mark private property rights legislation enacted during the 1995
19951
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Regular Session of the Florida Legislature.' The measure includes a
new cause of action providing judicial relief to landowners who suffer
inordinate burdens on the use of their land and a new nonjudicial set-
tlement and expedited hearing procedure promoting compromise solu-
tions for disputes between landowners and regulators.2
The legislation concluded three years of contentious debate over the
appropriate means to give landowners protection for the use of their
property beyond the constitutional guarantee against the taking of pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation.3 The new stat-
ute has stirred fears that it will empty the public purse and roll back
decades of work in environmental protection and growth manage-
ment, as well as countervailing concerns among landowners that it will
not protect them from the proliferation of regulations that impede
their efforts to put their land to productive use.4
If properly implemented and applied, the measure will have none of
the above effects. The legislation grants important new rights and
remedies to landowners while maintaining existing environmental pro-
tection and growth management programs. It protects landowners
against some regulatory actions which do not rise to the level of a
taking, but it is more limited in scope than property rights legislation
considered in Florida in recent years.' Perhaps most importantly, the
measure is intended to reform the way government does business with
landowners. 6 The legislation provides a measured response to a pres-
sing and emotional issue and strikes a balance between conflicting,
but equally valid, public and private interests.
II. BACKGROUND
The subject of private property rights is not new in Florida. From
the beginning of the period of environmental activism by the Florida
Legislature in the early 1970s, the issue of legal protections for private
property rights has generated much legislative activity. These efforts
have increased in recent years due to the controversies which have at-
tended the implementation of Florida's growth management pro-
grams. The trend in Florida to extend greater protection to private
1. FLA. STAT. § 70 (1995).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
4. Larry Kaplow, Panel OK's Compromise on Property Rights Bill, PAum BEACH POST,
Apr. 20, 1995, at A9.
5. Larry Kaplow, Property Rights Bill Readied, PALm BEAcH POST, Apr. 20, 1995, at Al.
6. Kaplow, supra note 4, at A9.
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property rights reflects national developments, both in statehouses
and in the Congress.7
A. The 1993 Regular Session of the Legislature
Although the public policy argument regarding increased protection
of private property rights has been simmering for several years, it was
only in 1993 that the Legislature considered the matter ripe for legisla-
tive attention. A bill was introduced into the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives which would have created a cause of action by which a
landowner could obtain a judicial order requiring condemnation of
his property. The order would apply to any governmental entity that
imposed a restriction which "severely limited the practical use of the
property," unless the restriction was an exercise of the police power to
prohibit a use that was "noxious in fact" or to prevent "a demonstra-
ble harm to public health and safety." 8 The court could have awarded
compensation to a prevailing landowner.
Significantly, the bill would have established a presumption that a
"severe limitation" on the practical use of an owner's land occurs
when its fair market value is reduced by forty percent from the uses
permitted at the time the owner acquired title or on July 1, 1985,
whichever was later.9 The bill was approved by the House Judiciary
Committee but died on the House calendar. 0
Instead, the Legislature enacted a measure which would have cre-
ated the Study Commission on Inverse Condemnation to explore and
recommend new remedies to protect landowners against the effects of
regulation."I Governor Chiles vetoed the measure; he objected to both
7. Since 1991, at least 19 states have enacted property rights legislation. See ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANt. §§ 9-462.02, 9-500.12, 9-500.13, 11-810, 11-811, 11-830(F), 41-1311 to 41-1313
(1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 70 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 67-8001 to
67-8004 (1995); IND. CODE § 4-22-2-32 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26 (1995); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-1 to 49-33-17 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
536.017, .018 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-102, 75-1-103, 75-1-201 (1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 73 (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §113-206(c) (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 105 (1994);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-1-201 to 12-1-204 (1995); TEX. GovT. CODE ANN. § 2007 (1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 63-90-1 to 63-90-4, 63-90a-1 to 63-90a-4 (1995); WASH. REv. CODE § 36.70A.370
(1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-IA-1 to 22-IA-6 (1995); Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-5-301 to 9-5-305 (1995).
For an overview of state property rights measures from a public-sector perspective, see Larry
Morandi, Takings for Granted, STATE LEGIsLAREatas, June 1995, at 22. For an overview of the
nationwide property rights movement from a private-sector perspective, see Peter Samuel, The
Property Rights Movement: Enviros, Regulators Meet Their Match, MINING VoIcE, May/June
1995, at 22.
8. Fla. HB 1437 (1993).
9. Id.
10. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1993 REGuLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF House BrLS
at 268, HB 1437.
11. Fla. SB 1000 (1993).
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the composition of the commission and its charge.' 2 He concluded
that the measure did not strike a balance between the legitimate inter-
ests of private landowners and the public interest in protecting the en-
vironment and managing Florida's growth. 3
B. The Governor's Property Rights Study Commission H
As an alternative to the vetoed 1993 legislation, Governor Chiles
created the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission II. 4 It was
patterned after the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission es-
tablished in 1975 by former Governor Reubin Askew, whose recom-
mendations led to the 1978 enactment of a statutory remedy for
landowners aggrieved by governmental restrictions." Governor Chiles
directed the new commission to consider, among other things, "[t]he
current and potential effectiveness of Florida law in providing sub-
stantially affected persons with appropriate remedies of law to protect
their private property rights and any changes necessary to assure
meaningful and effective remedy to affected property amounts." 6
Led by former Florida Supreme Court Justice Alan C. Sundberg of
Tallahassee, the commission held hearings throughout the state.' 7 Its
chief proposal was the creation of an informal, nonjudicial settlement
process to resolve property rights disputes between a landowner and a
governmental entity through payment of compensation or adjustment
of the regulation prior to litigation.1 8 The commission advised against
creating a new cause of action for landowners based on awarding
compensation for a percentage-diminution of the land's market
value. 9
12. veto of Fla. SB 1000 (1993) (letter from c'ov. Chiles to Sec'y of State Jim Smith, June
4, 1993) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
13. Id.
14. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-150 (June 4, 1993). The commission consisted of 17 members,
including: four landowners; one economist familiar with property valuation; two local govern-
ment officials; the secretaries of the Department of Community Affairs and the Department of
Environmental Protection; a water management district representative; four representatives of
conservation organizations; two persons recommended, respectively, by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate; and one member of The Florida Bar serving as chair of
the commission.
15. E.g., 1978, Fla. Laws ch. 78-85; see also Robert M. Rhodes, Compensating Police
Power Takings: Chapter 78-85, Laws of Florida, 52 FLA. B.J. 741 (Nov. 1978). For an account
of recent legislative activity in this field leading up to the 1995 Regular Session, see Kent Wether-
ell, Private Property Rights Legislation: The "Midnight Version" and Beyond, 22 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 525 (1994).
16. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-354, § 3(b) (Dec. 28, 1993).
17. GovRNOR'S PROP. RTs. STUDY COMM'N [, REPORT OF THa GOVEaNOR'S PROPERTY
RiGHTs STUDY ComasSIoN 11 (1994) [hereinafter GovERNOR's STUDY CO aSSION II].
18. Id. at 1.
19. Id. at 75-76.
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C. The 1994 Regular Session of the Legislature
The commission's proposal for a new settlement procedure was
considered during the 1994 Regular Session of the Legislature. 20 Other
bills would have allowed a landowner to seek compensation through a
judicial award when a regulation prohibited or severely limited the use
of the owner's real property. 21 Under these bills, if the governmental
entity imposing the regulation could not afford to pay the compensa-
tion, it would have been prohibited from imposing the restriction on
the landowner's property. 2 Neither approach, the settlement proce-
dure nor the court-ordered compensation bill, came to a floor vote.
21
D. The Constitutional Initiative on Property Rights
At the same time the Legislature was considering these measures, a
citizens' group mounted a well-funded petition drive for four constitu-
tional amendments bundled into one package for petition gathering
purposes. 24 One of the four proposed amendments would have created
a constitutional right to full compensation for a landowner when any
exercise of the police power diminished the value of a vested property
right.Y The package received enough signatures for a ballot position
in the 1994 general election.26
In a validation proceeding to determine whether the four amend-
ments satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements for sub-
mission to the electorate, the Florida Supreme Court struck the
property rights measure and two others from the ballot. 27 The court
held that the property rights amendment violated the single subject
requirement for constitutional initiatives2s and that its ballot title and
summary were not accurate or informative.29 This decision set the
stage for further legislative consideration of the property rights con-
troversy during the 1995 Regular Session.
20. Fla. HB 1967 (1994).
21. Fla. SB 630 (1994); Fla. HB 485 (1994).
22. Fla. SB 630 (1994); Fla. HB 485 (1994).
23. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1994 REOULAR SrSSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BnLS
at 345-46, HB 1967; id. at 74, SB 630; id. at 247-48, CS for HB 485.
24. Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re: Tax Limitation; Advisory Opinion to the Att'y
Gen. Re: Voter Approval of New Taxes; Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re: Property
Rights; Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re: Revenue Limits, 644 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 1994).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 494.
28. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
29. Advisory Opinion, 644 So. 2d at 494.
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E. The 1995 Regular Session of the Legislature
The supreme court's 1994 decision on the constitutional initiative
increased political pressure on lawmakers to legislate a solution to the
controversy. In addition, the perceived political climate underwent
dramatic changes in the 1994 general election. Nationally and in Flor-
ida, the tide of public opinion was illustrated by the change in parti-
san control of the Congress and the Florida Senate. When lawmakers
convened in Tallahassee, the Congress was considering property rights
legislation, and legislatures around the nation were continuing a trend
in enacting property rights laws .30
Both constitutional and statutory proposals were introduced into
the 1995 Regular Session.' One proposed constitutional amendment
would have provided that no owner could be deprived of a use of
private property, or any part of his property, by governmental regula-
tion or action resulting in a "nonnegligible" reduction in the fair mar-
ket value of that property without full compensation as determined by
a jury.32 A prevailing owner would have been entitled to costs and
attorney's fees."
Statutory measures considered would have declared that any lawful
use of private property could not be deprived or devalued, even tem-
porarily, by an action of government without full compensation.3 4 The
cause of action for such a deprivation or devaluation, entitling the
landowner to a jury determination of compensation, would have
arisen if the governmental action resulted in a temporary or perma-
nent diminution in fair market value of the affected portion of the
30. During the 1995 Regular Session, in Washington State, lawmakers gave legislative ap-
proval to a property rights initiative.
The Washington legislation, Initiative No. 164, the Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act,
required full compensation for any reduction in value caused by regulation to any parcel or
portion of private property. Any regulation of private property was prohibited unless a state-
ment analyzing the expected economic impact on regulated property was prepared by the regula-
tor and made available to the public prior to adoption. The initiative forbid governmental
entities from requiring any property owner to provide or pay for any studies, maps, plans, or
reports to be used in decisions that would restrict the use of private property for public use. See
Wash. C.A. 164 (1995) (subject to referendum).
On November 9, 1995, Referendum 48, previously Initiative No. 164, became the third such
referendum in the nation to be voted down. While the measure was defeated by a margin of 3-to-
2, proponents hope to enact a similar law in next year's legislative session. Doug Conner, Prop-
erty-Right Vote Losers To Keep Fighting, L.A. Trms, Nov. 9,1995, at Al.
31. Fla. SJR 968 (1995); Fla. HJR 1847 (1995) (proposed amendment to art. X, § 6, Fla.
Const.); Fla. CS for SB 1326 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
32. Fla. SJR 968 (1995); Fla. HJR 1847 (1995).
33. Fla. SJR 968 (1995); Fla. HJR 1847 (1995).
34. Fla. CS for SB 1326 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
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owner's land in excess of twenty-five percent or $10,000, whichever
was greater. The recovery of full compensation would not have been
limited by any percentage or dollar amount. 35 An exception to the
right of compensation would have been carved out for public nuis-
ances, but the governmental entity would have borne the burden of
proving that a proscribed land use constituted a public nuisance.3 6 A
prevailing owner would have been entitled to attorney's fees and
costs. 17
Against this backdrop, Governor Chiles sought to develop a more
restrained proposal to provide statutory protection for private prop-
erty rights without undermining Florida's environmental protection
and growth management programs .8
The Governor directed Secretary Linda Loomis Shelley of the Flor-
ida Department of Community Affairs to convene an ad hoc working
group to draft a consensus proposal which would win the support of
lawmakers and affected constituencies. 9
As the 1995 Regular Session unfolded, the working group toiled for
weeks with important support and involvement from legislative spon-
sors of various property rights measures. A constitutional remedy was
rejected as an option in order to allow any necessary adjustments in
the new remedy without the cumbersome and time-consuming proce-
dures involved in amending the Florida Constitution. 40
The working group produced a draft bill which included a statutory
remedy to provide compensation for landowners in situations which
do not rise to the level of a taking, but it rejected an automatic nu-
merical formula for determining when relief is warranted. 41 The bill
also included a new nonjudicial settlement and expedited hearing
35. The House bill did not specify that recovery would be available only if the diminution
of value exceeded the greater of $10,000 or 250/i. Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
36. Fla. CS for SB 1326 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
37. Fla. CS for SB 1326 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
38. Lucy Morgan, Chiles Seeks Law To Repay Small Landowners, ST. PEaT. Tnmis, Mar.
30, 1995, at B5.
39. The working group included representatives from state agencies, including the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs, the Department of Environmental Protection, and the Eminent
Domain Section of the Department of Transportation; regional entities, including regional plan-
ning councils and water management districts; local governments, including the Florida Associa-
tion of Counties and the Florida League of Cities; environmental organizations, including the
Florida Audubon Society, 1000 Friends of Florida, the Florida Wildlife Federation, and the
Florida Chapter of the American Planning Association; development interests, including the
Florida Home Builders Association and the Association of Florida Community Developers; and
landowning interests, such as the Florida Farm Bureau, the Florida Land Council, and the Prop-
erty Rights Coalition (an alliance of agricultural and landowner interests).
40. Morgan, supra note 38.
41. For a discussion on the drawbacks of the formulaic approach, see GovaRwOR's STUDY
COMaMSSION II, supra note 17, at 71-75.
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procedure for land use and environmental permitting disputes, a pro-
cedure patterned after the recommendations of the Governor's Prop-
erty Rights Study Commission lI.42 With only one significant change
by the Legislature, 43 the working group's bill was enacted by law-
makers with just one dissenting vote."
Aside from the scrutiny the bill received when being hammered out
in the working group, the legislation received ample hearing and for-
mal consideration by lawmakers. Section 1, which created the judicial
cause of action for landowner relief, was fully debated in both the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on
Community Affairs, as Senate Bill 2912. 4. Sections 2 through 5 were
added to Senate Bill 2912, which was reported favorably by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary as a committee substitute." Section 2,
which created the nonjudicial settlement and expedited hearing proce-
dure, also received a hearing in the Real Property and Family Law
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, as House
Bill 1335. 47
On the House floor, the provisions of Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 2912 and House Bill 1335 were incorporated into one
amendment which was adopted as a substitute for the language in an-
other bill, Committee Substitute for House Bill 863. That bill as
amended was then thoroughly debated and passed by the House.4
Committee Substitute for House Bill 863 was sent to the Senate for
floor debate and final legislative approval.' 9
III. THE BERT J. HARRIS, JR., PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROTECTION ACT
Section 1 of the legislation is the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Prop-
erty Rights Protection Act5° (Harris Act), named after the Highlands
42. For a discussion of the settlement procedure, see infra part IV.
43. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1050 (Reg. Sess. 1995); see Elizabeth Willson, Lobbyist Takes a Big
Leap-and Lands on Some Toes, ST. PETE. Tma, July 5, 1995, at B5. For the text of the
amendment, see infra text accompanying note 57.
44. FLA. H.R. JOuR. 1050 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
45. FLA. LEoLs., HISTORY OF LEoISLATnoN, 1995 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILS
at 266, SB 2912.
46. FLA. S. JOUR. 551 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
47. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEOISLATION, 1995 REGuLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE Bis
at 141, HB 1335. This bill was placed on the agenda for the House Judiciary Committee, but the
committee meeting was canceled for unrelated reasons, and the House Judiciary Committee did
not meet again during the 1995 Regular Session.
48. Id. at 101, HB 863; FLA. H.R. JoutR. 1050 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
49. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1050 (Reg. Sess. 1995).
50. FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995).
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County legislator who has championed property rights legislation for
years. The Harris Act creates a new cause of action to provide com-
pensation to a landowner when the actions of a governmental entity
impose an "inordinate burden" on the owner's real property.3 It is
intended to apply to governmental actions that do not rise to the level
of a regulatory taking."
In general, the new judicial remedy is intended to protect either a
landowner's existing use of the land or a vested right to a specific use
of the land from an inordinate burden which a state, regional, or local
governmental agency imposes. 3 This remedy is subject to many im-
portant limitations and exclusions." Therefore, in any potential claim
it is critical to evaluate the landowner's property interest in light of all
the statutory requirements for relief.
When compared to the textual basis for relief from a regulatory
taking, namely, the sparse language in the Fifth Amendment and the
Florida Constitution, the Harris Act is richly detailed in the substan-
tive legal standards and procedural mechanisms for obtaining relief.
However, precisely because Harris Act claims were expected to be "ad
hoc, factual inquiries, ' 55 as those in takings cases, the working group
which prepared the legislation favored an approach under which the
full import of the Harris Act ultimately would be determined by judi-
cial construction and application. In other words, judicial interpreta-
tion on a case-by-case basis was considered inevitable, necessary, and
desirable.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 70.001(9). The Harris Act filled a void in then-existing Florida law because, prior
to its enactment, there was no nmeans by which an owner could receive compensation for the
adverse financial effects of governmental regulation of his land without satisfying the constitu-
tional standards for a taking, namely, physical invasion or the loss of all economically viable
use. See Dep't of Comm'y Aff., CS for HB 863 (1995) Staff Analysis 1 (May 15, 1995) (on file
with Dept.).
53. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3) (1995). The Legislature did not appropriate funds for implemen-
tation of the Harris Act. See 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-181. To avoid running afoul of the constitu-
tional prohibition against unfunded mandates, article VII, section 18, of the Florida
Constitution, the Legislature expressly determined in the Harris Act that there was an important
state interest in protecting private property owners from inordinate burdens on their property.
FLA. STAT. § 70.001(1) (1995).
The Legislature also met two of the listed alternatives which remove an enactment from this
constitutional bar: 1) that any expenditure necessary under the Act would apply to all persons
similarly situated, including state and local governments, section 70.001(3), Florida Statutes; and
2) the Act was approved by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each chamber of the Legisla-
ture. The vote was 111-0 in the House of Representatives, and 38-1 in the Senate. FLA. LEGIS.,
HISTORY OF LEOISLATION, 1995 REGuLAR SESSboN, HISTORY or HousE BnmLs at 101, HB 863; see
also Dep't of Comm'y Aff., CS for HB 863 (1995) Staff Analysis 6 (May 15, 1995) (on file with
Dept.).
54. For a discussion of the limitations and exclusions, see part lII.C.
55. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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A. Definitions
In any legislative enactment, the definitions imposed on particular
terms are crucial for understanding the scope of the measure. That is
certainly true with the Harris Act; it includes a number of definitions
which are intended to set boundaries on the scope of the statute.
1. Existing Use
The Legislature adopted two alternative definitions for an "existing
use" of land which is protected by the Harris Act. Both reflect estab-
lished legal principles.
a. Actual, Present Use or Activity
An existing use of land means "an actual, present use or activity on
the real property," notwithstanding periods of inactivity normally as-
sociated with or incidental to the activity . 6 This portion of the defini-
tion of existing use is intended to encompass land uses engaged in by
the landowner even though there might be some intermittent quality
to the use or activity. For example, a period of inactivity could in-
clude land's lying fallow in association with the growing of crops or
timber.
b. Reasonably Foreseeable Future Use
An existing use also may mean
such reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are
suitable for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent
land uses and which have created an existing fair market value in the
property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use
or activity on the real property."
So long as the requested use is suitable for the property, compatible
with adjacent land uses, justifiable by an appraisal, and is not specu-
lative, it would qualify as an existing use protected by the Harris Act
from certain governmental actions.5 8
This alternative definition of existing use was and is very controver-
sial, primarily among those who did not favor the enactment of
56. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(b) (1995).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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property rights legislation. 9 In fact the definition stitches together
longstanding concepts which are not usually linked together and re-
casts them in a new legal context.6 Aside from its merit on legal and
policy grounds, this provision was central to building a broad base of
political support for passage of the legislation.
The first drafts of the Harris Act were considered by some legisla-
tors and participants in the working group to offer little or nothing to
the landowners whose disputes with regulatory agencies had propelled
the property rights movement I. 6 Because government is already equita-
bly estopped from impairing vested rights to existing uses, these legis-
lators and landowners viewed the early drafts of the Harris Act, which
protected "vested rights" and an existing use defined only as "an ac-
tual, present use or activity" on the land, as offering only an addi-
tional item on the menu of remedies already available to landowners. 2
Further, these legislators and landowners recognized that government
only rarely deprives a landowner of the actual, present use of land,
halts an activity being conducted on an owner's land, or seeks to in-
fringe on a vested right.63 Accordingly, for the Harris Act to be mean-
ingful to landowners, it had to offer a remedy in some circumstances
in which regulatory permission was denied for the conversion of land
to a future use in which the owner's rights were not otherwise pro-
tected.
As a legal concept for an existing land use, the alternative definition
is well-grounded in the law of eminent domain. 4 In a condemnation
proceeding, valuation of the property is based upon the highest and
best use.65 The highest and best use is not limited to those uses author-
ized under the existing land development regulations." If on the date
of taking there is a reasonable probability of a land use change, that
probability may be taken into account in determining valuation.6 7 An
59. Elizabeth Willson, Property Act Fences Out the Government, ST. PaTE. TIMEs, July 5,
1995, at BI.
60. See, e.g., Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979); Board of Comm'rs of
State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 100 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), cert. denied,
101 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1958).
61. Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 19, 1995) (on file with
comm.) (discussion of SB 2912); Fla. S. Comm. on Comm'y Aff., tape recording of proceedings
(Apr. 24, 1995) (on file with comm.) (discussion of SB 2912).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. FLORIDA EMINENT DomAIN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9.32 (4th ed., Fla. Bar C.L.E.
1988) [hereinafter FLORIDA EMINENT DoMArN].
65. State Road Dep't Co. v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1963); Cameron Dev. Co. v.
United States, 145 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1994).
66. FLORMA EMINENT DomAiN, supra note 64, § 9.33.
67. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs of State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 100 So.
2d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), cert. denied, 101 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1958).
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important factor in determining the highest and best use of property is
whether the property is suitable for that proposed future use.A How-
ever, such a future use may not be wholly speculative. 69
Seen in the context of the law of eminent domain, there are circum-
stances in which a prospective future use may be considered an exist-
ing land use, and therefore compensable. That is at the heart of the
Harris Act's alternative definition of an existing land use, which
reaches some future uses. Altogether, it is a remarkably conventional
idea in a legal system which has embraced the doctrine of future inter-
ests in land since medieval England. 70
The proof necessary to establish that a future land use is reasonably
foreseeable could come from such authorities as an adopted local
comprehensive plan, local land development regulations, or a credible
appraisal which relies at least in part on nonexisting but reasonably
expected future uses. 7' Particularly relevant would be evidence of the
owner's ability or inability to secure financing based on these docu-
ments. 72 The comprehensive plan and land development regulations
adopted by the relevant local government also would have a bearing
on the suitability and compatibility issues.
This alternative definition is intended to reach future land uses such
as "next-in-line" acreage adjacent to developed or developing lands.
This is particularly applicable when a landowner applies for approval
of a use already enjoyed by neighboring landowners. But even in these
cases the application of the alternative definition is not revolutionary.
A landowner who could meet the test of this alternative definition
probably would have a cause of action founded on reverse spot zon-
ing, denial of equal protection, or perhaps deprivation of substantive
due process, based on the argument that denying the requested land
use would be arbitrary and capricious. Nevertheless, as with situations
in which the doctrine of equitable estoppel might apply, the Harris
Act represents a new opportunity for compensation where only an eq-
uitable remedy previously was available.
68. FLORIDA EMNENT Dosz.nt, supra note 64, § 9.32.
69. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1955).
70. See generally WLkm HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 34-73, 171-85 (5th ed.
1942).
71. FLORIDA EuNENT DOMAIN, supra note 64, § 9.32. It would go too far, however, for a
local government to utilize its comprehensive plan to purport to define the term "reasonably
foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses" for Harris Act purposes in a way other than it has been
defined by the Legislature-any more than a local government could adopt its own definitions
for the terms "equitable estoppel" or "substantive due process" as utilized in the Harris Act.
72. Id.
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2. Vested Rights
A "vested right to a specific use" under the Harris Act must be
determined by applying common law principles of equitable estoppel,
constitutional principles of substantive due process, or state statutory
principles. 73 These foundations for establishing vested rights are sepa-
rate and independent; accordingly, rights may vest for purposes of the
Harris Act under any one of these three alternative theories.
a. Equitable Estoppel
The estoppel doctrine is grounded in equity and focuses on whether
it would be inequitable to allow a governmental entity to repudiate its
prior conduct. 74 In one of the leading cases, the Second District Court
of Appeal followed the trial court in explaining that
... the theory of estoppel amounts to nothing more than an
application of the rules of fair play. One party will not be permitted
to invite another onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to
snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party induced or
permitted to stand thereon. 7
Equitable estoppel will be applied to government regulation of land
use if a property owner in good faith, while relying upon some act or
omission of government, has made a substantial change in position or
has incurred extensive obligations and expenses, so that it would be
inequitable and unjust to destroy the acquired right. 76 Each of these
vesting criteria has received valuable judicial interpretation and appli-
cation, 77 and the Legislature relied on these cases in establishing an
equitable estoppel basis for vesting.7
The remedy provided by the doctrine of equitable estoppel is to bar
the governmental entity from interfering with the owner's rights
73. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(a) (1995).
74. E.g., Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963) (estoppel applied
against city to forbid rescission of a building permit); see also Robert M. Rhodes & Cathy M.
Sellers, Vested Rights: Establishing Predictability in a Changing Regulatory System, 20 STETSON
L. REv. 475, 476 (1991).
75. Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
(quoting trial court).
76. Id; see also City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1973), rev'd in part, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976).
77. Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 74, at 478-89.
78. FLA. STAT. § 70.80(a) (1995).
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acquired by virtue of his reliance on the prior governmental action. 79
In other words, the owner gets to complete the authorized activity.
Compensation is not a remedy. 0 Therefore, by providing equitable es-
toppel as one basis for acquiring rights which may be a basis for a
Harris Act claim, the Legislature in effect has added compensation as
a remedy for the landowner in a certain category of equitable estoppel
cases.
b. Substantive Due Process
Rights also may vest for purposes of the Harris Act by applying
principles of substantive due process."' This provision enables the ju-
diciary to craft a constitutionally based vesting test that is separate
from takings theories or remedies and distinct from equitable estop-
pel.82
True to its substantive due process roots, this vesting standard
could focus on whether an owner has acquired a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest that should not be diminished or frustrated by
government action." In some instances, the protected interest could be
established by applying and satisfying estoppel principles, but the new
test should go further. 4
The linchpin for establishing substantive due process vesting could
be the existence of reasonable, investment-backed expectations in a
particular use.85 This approach draws from a judicially crafted con-
cept which courts have used to analyze both takings and Fourteenth
Amendment vested rights claims .86 In addition, it parallels the statu-
tory test for determining whether property is inordinately burdened.8 7
This test would mean an inordinate burden need not be found if
vested rights exist based on investment-backed expectations. A
79. Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 74, at 475; see also City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn, 427
So. 2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
80. Rhodes & Sellers, supra note 74, at 475.
81. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3) (1995); see also Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474
U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
82. Regarding the recognized but muddled distinction between equitable estoppel and con-
stitutionally-based vested rights, see David G. Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Prin-
ciples of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63-65;
see also City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 537 So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
83. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972).
84. Perry, 408 U.S. at 601; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
85. For a comprehensive discussion of investment-backed expectations, see Daniel Man-
delker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URBa. LAw. 215 (1995).
86. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
87. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995).
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determination of whether vested rights exist is only the first step in
evaluating a Harris Act claim; determining whether the governmental
action inordinately burdens those rights is the next. An inordinate
burden may be found only if a restrictive government action results in
an owner's permanent inability to attain reasonable, investment-
backed expectations in a vested right. 8 Thus, relying upon the concept
of reasonable, investment-backed expectations both to establish a
vested right and to determine whether the governmental action consti-
tutes an inordinate burden is not a tautology.
Vested rights founded on substantive due process could extend pro-
tection to situations which might not be covered by estoppel. Con-
sider, for example, multiple-phase or multiple-use projects for which
only a conceptual or master plan and a first phase or initial use have
been approved when government imposes new regulatory restraints. If
an owner can establish a property interest founded on reasonable, in-
vestment-backed expectations in completing the entire project and all
uses, the interest may vest for purposes of the Harris Act under this
substantive due process theory.8 9 By contrast, if applying the doctrine
of equitable estoppel, which focuses on an owner's reliance and
change of position on a specific governmental action, in certain cir-
cumstances, only the approved first phase or initial use may be vested
for Harris Act purposes. 90
c. Statutory Vesting
The Harris Act protects rights vested by virtue of legislative enact-
ments. A variety of statutes create such rights. Among them are
vested rights provisions in the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, 9' the Florida Envi-
ronmental Land and Water Management Act, 92 the statute creating
the surface water management regulatory program, 9 and the statute
creating the coastal construction control line program.9
Local government vesting provisions, on the other hand, are not
addressed under this provision and therefore are not a basis for a
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. For an example of partial vesting by application of statutory criteria, see Compass Lake
Hills Dev. Corp. v. Department of Comm'y Aff., Div. of State Planning, 379 So. 2d 376 (Fla.
1st DCA 1979) (partial vesting under section 380.06(12), now codified at section 380.06(20),
Florida Statutes (1995)).
91. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(8) (1995).
92. Id. § 380.05(18) (areas of critical state concern); id. § 380.06(20) (developments of re-
gional impact).
93. Id. §373.414(11)-(16).
94. Id. § 161.052.
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Harris Act claim. However, a local government vesting ordinance
should be a basis for a Harris Act claim if it fairly implements a par-
ticular state statute. For example, local government comprehensive
plan policies and land development regulations which implement sec-
tion 163.3167(8), Florida Statutes, by defining "a final local develop-
ment order" or by establishing when development "is continuing in
good faith" should be covered by this theory.95
Local government plan policies or development regulations which
codify equitable estoppel common law principles are not covered by
the Harris Act's categorical protection of rights vested pursuant to
state statute. However, as noted, owners who can satisfy common law
equitable estoppel criteria will be vested under the previously dis-
cussed part of the Act's vested rights definition.
3. Governmental Entity
A "governmental entity" includes any agency of the state, any re-
gional agency, any local government entity, or any other entity that
independently exercises governmental authority.9 It does not matter
whether the governmental entity was created by the Florida
Constitution 97 or by general or special law. The United States and its
various agencies do not fall within this definition; thus their actions
are not subject to relief under the Harris Act.
4. Action of a Governmental Entity
The term "action of a governmental entity" means a specific action
which affects real property. 98 It expressly includes action by the gov-
ernmental entity on an application for development approval or other
permit,99 but it is intended to go beyond that to other actions which
adversely affect the ability of a landowner to use the land.1°°
The governmental action must have "directly restricted or limited
the use" of the owner's land.' 0 ' This requirement should be
95. See id. § 163.3167(8).
96. Id. § 70.001(3)(c).
97. This provision encompasses the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. FLA,
CONST. art. IV, § 9. It also precludes any argument that certain local governmental entities ad-
dressed in the Florida Constitution are not within the ambit of the Harris Act. E.g., id. art,
VIII, § 6(e), (f) (Metropolitan Dade County).
98. FLA. STAT. §70.001(3)(d) (1995).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 70.001(3)(e). Although technically part of the definition of an inordinate burden,
this phrase is important primarily for delineating the type of governmental action which is sub-
ject to a Harris Act claim.
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interpreted to mean that an action's effect is "[i]n a direct way with-
out anything intervening; not by secondary, but by direct, means."' 12
A governmental action which indirectly burdened or inadvertently de-
valued an owner's land, because of regulatory decisions regarding an-
other owner's property, would be too attenuated for relief under the
Harris Act.° 3
On the other hand, the directness requirement should not be con-
verted into a straitjacket. It should not, for example, be construed to
mean that a statute, rule, ordinance, or regulation must specifically
set forth in detail the precise restriction on a particular owner's prop-
erty. Such a construction would be at odds with the legislative intent
that the Harris Act address grievances arising from statutes, rules, re-
gulations, or ordinances "as applied" to private land. 104
Governmental inaction, that is, the decision by a governmental en-
tity not to act, is not within the ambit of the Harris Act.
5. Inordinate Burden
After demonstrating the existing use or a vested right to a specific
use, a landowner must then demonstrate that the governmental action
is an "inordinate burden," which entitles him to relief. 05 In order to
demonstrate an inordinate burden, the landowner must meet either
one of two statutory tests.
a. Expectations Not Realized
Under the first test, the effect of the governmental action must sat-
isfy three criteria. 106 First, the governmental action must have directly
restricted or limited the use of real property to the extent that the
landowner is unable to realize the reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectation of the existing use of the real property or a vested right to a
specific use of the real property.tm Second, the deprivation of the rea-
sonable, investment-backed expectation must be permanent.'08 Third,
the deprivation must expressly be to the real property as a whole.109
102. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 414 (6th ed. 1990).
103. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 95-78 (1995). A cause of action must be commenced no more than
one year "after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at
issue." FiA. STAT. §70.001(11) (1995) (emphasis added).
104. Id. § 70.001(1).
105. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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b. Unreasonable Use and Unfair Burden
The alternative test for demonstrating an inordinate burden is to
show that, by virtue of the regulatory action, the landowner has been
left with existing uses or vested rights which are so unreasonable that
the landowner permanently bears a disproportionate share of a bur-
den imposed for the good of the public and which, in fairness, should
be borne by the public."I0 This test allows the court to take remedial
action when governmental action has been unreasonable or has exces-
sively limited the uses on a landowner's property.
There are limitations and exceptions with respect to when a govern-
mental entity has inordinately burdened an owner's land. These limi-
tations and exceptions, discussed below with similar provisions,"' will
limit the circumstances in which relief will be available under the Har-
ris Act. For overriding policy reasons, some governmental actions will
continue to be subject only to the other constitutional and statutory
remedies which are otherwise available to a landowner." 2
6. Property Owner
The term "property owner" means the "person who holds legal ti-
tle to the real property" which is the subject of the Harris Act
claim."' Under existing Florida law, a person may include a natural
person, firm, association, joint venture, partnership, estate, trust,
business trust, syndicate, fiduciary, corporation, or other group or
combination." 4 Any one of those then may initiate a Harris Act
claim. Governmental entities expressly not included in this definition
are thus not considered persons under the Harris Act and therefore
may not bring a Harris Act claim.''5
The Harris Act does not expressly address the nature of the estate in
land that a person must hold in order to bring a Harris Act claim, but
a broad reading of the statute would reach any legal interest in land,
such as an easement serving a legal interest. A person with only an
equitable or other beneficial interest appears not to be authorized to
bring a Harris Act claim.
110. Id.
111. See infra part In.C.
112. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995).
113. Id. § 70.001(3)(f).
114. Id. § 1.01.
115. See id.
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7. Real Property
The term "real property" means "land, and includes any appurte-
nances and improvements to the land" as well as any other relevant
land in which the owner has a relevant interest. 116 There are at least
two significant aspects to this definition.
First, this definition expressly includes "any other relevant real
property in which the property owner had a relevant interest"; it thus
encompasses the entire parcel in which the owner has a legal inter-
est." 7 This construction is supported by reading it in conjunction with
the definition of "inordinate burden," which expressly requires that
the existence of an inordinate burden be determined by reference "to
the real property as a whole.""" Thus, the court will be required to
determine-by examining other relevant parcels of real property in
which the owner has a relevant interest-whether the property "as a
whole" has been inordinately burdened."19 This whole-parcel require-
ment reflects precedent in the context of constitutional takings. '20
Second, the term "real property" includes "any appurtenances and
improvements to the land."'' This phrase is patterned after the defi-
nition of "land" in the Florida Environmental Land and Water Man-
agement Act, 122 but it goes further by not including customary notions
of land as a limitation on the improvements and appurtenances which
will be regarded as real property for purposes of the Harris Act. 123
B. Procedure for Bringing a Civil Action
The Harris Act sets forth, in detail, the procedure which a land-
owner must follow in bringing a claim under the statute. It is intended
116. Id. § 70.001(3)(g).
117. Id. The use of the term "relevant interest" in the definition of real property is unfortu-
nate. It should be read as meaning a legal interest in land; to read the statute otherwise would be
inconsistent with the use of the term "legal title" in the definition of property owner.
118. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
119. Id.
120. Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla, Inc., 636 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1994); Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Schindler, 604 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); De-
partment of Transp. v. Jirik, 471 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), approved, 498 So. 2d 1253
(Fla. 1986); Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, 442 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983).
In determining whether portions of an owner's property should be considered as a whole or
treated separately, courts have considered such factors as parcel contiguity, unity of use, unity of
ownership, intent of the owner, and particular factual circumstances. City of Riviera Beach v.
Shillingburg, 659 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
121. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(g) (1995).
122. Id. § 380.031(7) (" 'land' includes any improvements or structures customarily regarded
as land").
123. For example, billboards would fall within the ambit of this definition even though they
might not be considered a customary appurtenance or improvement to the land.
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both to strike a balance between public and private interests and also
to promote settlement short of a judicially imposed resolution of the
dispute.
1. Actions Prior to Filing a Civil Action
Before bringing a civil action under the Harris Act, the landowner
must notify the governmental entity of the claim and wait a limited
period of time for a response. 1 This notification process is one of the
procedural devices built into the Harris Act to promote settlements
without resort to litigation.
a. Conditions Precedent
At least 180 days prior to filing a civil action, the landowner must
present a written claim to the head of the governmental entity which
has taken the action at issue.1 21 The claim must be accompanied by a
bona fide appraisal which demonstrates the loss in fair market value
to the property. 126 This requirement is based on similar requirements
in other statutes which authorize legal actions against governmental
entities. 27 It is intended to put the governmental entity on notice of its
potential liability and to create an opportunity for settlement, but-as
will be seen-the requirement also gives the governmental entity a
chance to improve its position in any subsequent litigation.
If more than one governmental entity is involved in the govern-
mental action or, if in the view of either the landowner or a govern-
mental entity to whom a claim is presented, all relevant issues can be
resolved only by involving more than one governmental entity, the
landowner must present the claim to each governmental entity
124. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a) (1995).
125. Id.
126. Id. The Harris Act does not require that the appraiser preparing the appraisal be certi-
fied, licensed, or registered. Id. Section 475.612, Florida Statutes, prohibits persons from using
the titles "certified real estate appraiser," "licensed real estate appraiser," "registered real estate
appraiser," or other words to that effect, without being certified, registered, or licensed in ac-
cordance with chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Generally, such certification, registration, or licen-
sure by the Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board is required for persons who hold themselves out
as certified, registered, or licensed, or who issue appraisal reports in connection with federally
related transactions. See id. §§ 475.610, .612, .613. The requirements that the appraisal be
"bona fide" and "valid" allow the governmental entity to whom the appraisal is submitted to
exercise some judgment as to the quality of the appraisal. Id. § 70.001(4)(a). Since the appraisal
requirement is intended to support the claim of the owner, the greater the validity of the ap-
praisal, the greater the likelihood that the governmental entity would rely on the appraisal in
evaluating the owner's claim.
127. E.g., id. § 403.412.
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involved.' 2 Because the owner may subsequently commence a civil ac-
tion only against a governmental entity which has received the claim
and had a 180-day notice period, 29 the Harris Act creates an incentive
for an owner to bring in all governmental entities which may be liable.
b. Written Offer to the Landowner
During the 180-day notice period, the governmental entity must
make a written settlement offer to resolve the claim. A settlement of-
fer may include 1) an adjustment of development or permit standards
which control the use of the land; 2) increases or modifications in the
density, intensity, or use of development areas; 3) transfer of develop-
ment rights; 4) land swaps or exchanges; 5) mitigation, including pay-
ments instead of on-site mitigation; 6) location on the least sensitive
portion of the property; 7) conditions on the amount of development
or use of the land; 8) a requirement that issues be addressed more
comprehensively than the use or uses immediately proposed; 9) issu-
ance of a development order, variance, special exception, or other
form of extraordinary relief; 10) public purchase of the owner's prop-
erty, or acquisition of a less-than-fee-simple interest in it; or 11) no
change to the governmental action which occasioned the claim. 30
This broad authority and menu of options creates an opportunity
for innovation in resolving disputes with landowners, even if some of
these remedial steps are not otherwise addressed by the governmental
entity's underlying regulatory code.
c. Acceptance and Resolution
When a settlement would constitute a modification, variance, or
special exception to application of an ordinance, rule, or regulation,
the Harris Act directs that the relief protect the public interest served
by the ordinance, rule, or regulation at issue and be appropriate to
prevent the inordinate burden on the real property.' 3'
The Harris Act also delegates to each state, regional, and local gov-
ernmental entity the authority to enter into a settlement which
128. Id. § 70.001(4)(a). The Harris Act thus gives the governmental entity the opportunity, in
effect, to implead another governmental entity prior to a complaint being filed in circuit court.
Unfortunately, the statute does not prescribe the procedural mechanisms for accomplishing this
intention. Apparently, the governmental entity receiving the initial claim may require the land-
owner to serve a copy of the claim on another governmental entity. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 70.001(4)(c). This list of potential remedies is almost identical to the remedies
proposed for consideration in the nonjudicial settlement procedure established in section 2 of the
legislation. Id. § 70.50(19)(b); see infra text accompanying note 361.
131. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)l (1995).
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contravenes statutory requirements so long as it "protects the public
interest served by the statute, . . . and is the appropriate relief neces-
sary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately
burdening the real property.' 32 In addition, the court must approve
the settlement in a consent decree.133
The public policy issues which may come into conflict through im-
plementation of this pre-suit settlement provision were addressed re-
cently by the Florida Supreme Court. In Abramson v. Florida
Psychological Association,'34 the supreme court upheld a settlement
agreement by which the Florida Department of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation agreed to the licensure of two psychologists, subject
to certain conditions, even though the applicants did not meet all stat-
utory requirements."' The supreme court succinctly explained the con-
flicting legal and policy issues in this way: "Administrative agencies
have the authority to interpret the laws which they administer, but
such interpretation cannot be contrary to clear legislative intent. At
the same time, the power of a public body to settle litigation is inci-
dental to and implied from its power to sue and be sued.' 136
In its decision, the court declined to answer a certified question re-
garding the circumstances under which an agency may settle a lawsuit
on terms inconsistent with its delegated legislative authority "because
[the court does] not believe that a general rule can be formulated
which would be applicable under all circumstances.' '137 Further, the
supreme court confined its ruling to the facts of the case and reiter-
ated the litany of reasons offered by the agency as justification for the
settlement. 3 8 Plainly, the court was uneasy about the case.
While the Abramson decision does not provide firm footing for the
pre-suit settlement provision of the Harris Act, 3 9 it does provide a
132. Id. § 70.001(4)(d)2.
133. Id. § 70.001(4)(d)2. For a thorough discussion of issues related to utilizing consent de-
crees as settlement vehicles, see David L. Callies, The Use of Consent Decrees in Settling Land
Use and Environmental Disputes, 21 SmTsoN L. REv. 871 (1992).
134. 634 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1994), reversing, 610 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
135. Id. It was not clear whether the settlement was the subject of a consent decree entered
by the court, but the original litigation continued with other plaintiffs after the two psychologists
settled and withdrew from the original litigation. Id. It was a subsequent challenge to implemen-
tation of the settlement which led to the decision by the Florida Supreme Court.
136. Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The decision has been criticized for containing "no real discussion of the critical issue
regarding the source of legal authority for an agency to enter into a settlement agreement which
contravenes the agency's enabling act." Scott Boyd, How the Exception Makes the Rule: Agency
Waiver of Statutes, Rules, and Precedent in Florida, 7 ST. THOMAS L. Rv. 287, 298 (1995).
In another recent case, a divided court affirmed without discussion a consent decree which was
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frame of reference for evaluating the issues raised by this provision.
First, the supreme court acknowledged that the settlement of litigation
is incidental to the authority to sue and be sued. 40 Second, in the best
manner of case-by-case adjudication, the court focused on the justifi-
cations for this particular settlement, noting that the deviation from
the statute was "minimal.' 4 1 Third, and most importantly, the court
observed that agencies may not act "contrary to clear legislative in-
tent." 142 This third observation presents the crux of the matter here.
The Harris Act provides clear legislative authority for a govern-
mental entity to make a minimal departure from a statutory require-
ment in a particular case where a Harris Act claim has been filed by a
landowner. This express legislative direction, coupled with the implied
authority to enter into settlements by virtue of a governmental entity's
authority to sue or be sued 43 and the public policy in favor of settling
disoutes,'" provides the necessary legal basis for pre-suit settlements
which include discrete deviations from statutory requirements.
This grant of authority satisfies the separation of powers provision
of the Florida Constitution.' 4  In a Harris Act settlement, any depar-
ture from existing statutory requirements must "protect the public in-
terest served by" the underlying statute, and it must provide no more
than "the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental
regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real property." ' 46
These criteria constitute the "minimal standards and guidelines' '1 47
tantamount to an exception to statutory dredge-and-fill permitting requirements. Eastpointe
Condominium Ass'n I, Inc. v. Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 636 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
(per curiam affirmance). In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Glickstein objected to the court's
affirmance of the consent decree partially because existing law did not authorize the permit ex-
ception. Id. at 723. In a companion case that may presage issues arising from implementation of
the pre-suit settlement provision of the Harris Act, the same court affirmed the agency's denial
of a petition by a third party requesting a formal administrative hearing on the agency's decision
to enter into the settlement agreement which resulted in the consent decree. The court grounded
the latter decision solely on its affirmance of the consent decree. Singer Island Civic Ass'n, Inc.
v. State Dept. of Envt'l Reg., 636 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), rev. granted, 649 So. 2d 234
(Fla. 1994), rev. denied sub nomn., 652 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1995).
140. Abramson v. Florida Psychological Association, 634 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1994), re-
versing, 610 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. Like its predecessors, this provision incorporates the nondele-
gation doctrine into the state's organic law. See, e.g., State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 47
So. 969, 976 (Fla. 1908) (The Legislature "may not delegate the power to enact a law or to
declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law.").
(emphasis added).
146. Fs.A. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)1-2 (1995).
147. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978).
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necessary to prevent governmental entities from "acting through
whim, favoritism, or unbridled discretion."14
Though general in nature, these standards are valid and adequate.
The supreme court has held that the specificity of standards provided
by the Legislature "may depend upon the subject matter dealt with
and the degree of difficulty involved in articulating finite stan-
dards. 1 49 Given the complexity and technical nature of the situations
which may arise under Harris Act claims and the number and diver-
sity of the state, regional, and local governmental entities charged
with implementing the measure, the Harris Act presents a situation
which is "not conducive to specific, detailed instructions from the
Legislature."' 50 While general, these standards nevertheless "are sus-
ceptible of legal interpretation based upon the facts of a given
case."' Accordingly, they satisfy the requirements of the nondelega-
tion doctrine.
Even if the statutory standards are deemed inadequate for separa-
tion of powers purposes, the courts have recognized an exception to
the nondelegation doctrine which would apply. This exception applies
when the statutory delegation involves exercise of the police power to
regulate a business operated as a privilege rather than a right.5 2 In
such situations, it is not essential that the statute include a specific
standard for the exercise of discretion. Instead, the governmental ac-
tion is limited by a standard of reasonableness.'
The regulated activities being addressed under the Harris Act fall
within that exception. In Apalachee Regional Planning Council v.
Brown,5 4 the First District Court of Appeal applied this exception to
fee-setting for review of developments of regional impact (DRIs) be-
cause the DRI law "serves as a control of the privileges of land devel-
opment which is potentially dangerous to the citizens of more than
one county." 5 The court characterized the DRI process as a dynamic
one, requiring "a large degree of flexibility and expertise due to a
148. In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov., 509 So. 2d 292, 311 (Fla. 1987).
149. Id.
150. Bigler v. Department of Banking & Fin., 368 So. 2d 449, 450-51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979),
aff'd, 394 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1981).
151. Safer v. City of Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8, 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).
152. Apalachee Regional Planning Council v. Brown, 546 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA
1989), aff'd, 560 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1990).
153. Department of Bus. Reg. v. Jones, 474 So. 2d 359, 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. de-
nied, 484 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1986).
154. 546 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), aff'd, 560 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1990).
155. Id. at453.
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myriad of variables,"' 156 which make precise statutory standards un-
realistic. 117
Similarly, the regulated activities addressed by the Harris Act in-
volve land development. Governmental entities, in their adherence to
the Harris Act, will be faced with a wide range of issues regarding the
application of many statutory measures to many owners. The "com-
plexity and needed flexibility inherent in the [regulation of land devel-
opment] as it applies to individual applicants is too pronounced to be
practicably placed within the scope of legislative responsibility.' '58
Therefore, in implementing the pre-suit settlement provisions of the.
Harris Act, governmental entities would be subject to a rule of rea-
sonableness in the absence of valid minimal standards and guidelines.
Of course, there are legal obstacles to be negotiated along the path
of pre-suit settlement. For example, any settlement must be structured
to avoid claims of contract zoning. 159 It also must accord all interested
parties a modicum of procedural due process, especially in situations
which do not require judicial review. 6 While this provision is an im-
portant remedy under the Harris Act, it is distinct from the judicial
remedy provided elsewhere in the statute and constitutes a separate
means for achieving resolution of land use disputes.' 6'
As a practical matter, the situations in which these aspects of the
pre-suit settlement provision will be implicated will be rare precisely
because one of the standards is that the settlement "protect the public
interest served by" the statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance at issue
in the Harris Act claim. 162 While this provision is intended to open
new options for creative problem solving, this standard will constrain
governmental entities in settling Harris Act claims.
d. Ripeness Decision
Also during the 180-day notice period, unless the landowner accepts
the settlement offer, the governmental entity must provide the land-
owner with a written "ripeness decision.' ' 63 The Harris Act does not
prescribe the form or specific contents of the ripeness decision, but it
sets forth the general requirement that the ripeness decision
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Robert M. Rhodes, Terry E. Lewis & James C. Hauser, Contract and Conditional
Zoning: The Not So Dubious Distinction, 56 FIA. B.J. 263 (Mar. 1982).
160. See Callies, supra note 133, at 879-95.
161. See Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1968).
162. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)1 (1995).
163. Id. § 70.001(5)(a).
19951
282 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:255
"identif[y] the allowable uses to which the subject property may be
put" under the applicable regulations of the issuing governmental en-
tity.'6
The ripeness decision is intended to permit the landowner to go di-
rectly to circuit court after the expiration of the 180-day notice period,
rather than having to pursue other administrative remedies.' 6' This
procedural device was deemed an essential feature of the Harris Act
because the issue of ripeness goes to whether the court has subject
matter jurisdiction to hear a claim and, in the takings context, has
become a major source of frustration for landowners.166
Under the prudential doctrine of ripeness in the land use setting,
compensation claims are not within the court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion until the governmental "authority has determined the nature and
extent of the development that will be permitted" on the subject prop-
erty. 161 The drafters of the Harris Act concluded that, for an owner to
have a meaningful judicial remedy under the Act if a settlement were
not reached during the 180-day notice period, the issue of ripeness
should not be allowed to impede the owner's subsequent request for
judicial relief. 16s Thus, the drafters came up with the requirement for
a ripeness decision.169
164. Id.
165. Id. Significantly, the Harris Act provides that "the matter shall be deemed ripe or final
for the purposes of the judicial proceeding created by this section." Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
a ripeness decision in response to a Harris Act claim will not necessarily satisfy the ripeness
requirements for other types of actions, specifically for a civil action alleging a taking without
just compensation.
166. E.g., Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
167. Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 721 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1120 (1991); see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985).
Florida courts have adopted federal doctrine on ripeness. E.g., Glisson v. Alachua County,
558 So. 2d 1030, 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990). For a compre-
hensive review of federal and state ripeness cases in a regulatory taking context, see Taylor v.
Village of North Palm Beach, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1831 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 16, 1995).
168. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a) (1995).
169. This provision is intended to preclude Kafkaesque situations such as the ping-pong judi-
cial proceedings involving Richard and Anne Reahard of Lee County, Florida. Reahard v. Lee
County, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, No. 89-227-CIV-FTM-
10C. In the period leading up to enactment of the Harris Act, the Reahard case had a profound
effect on Florida landowners' perceptions about the efficacy of existing judicial remedies for
their grievances. Id.
In 1989, the Reahards sued Lee County for taking their property by designating it a Resource
Protection Area under the Lee County Comprehensive Plan. Id. The lawsuit was filed in state
circuit court. Id. It was removed to United States District Court on the motion of Lee County.
Id. A federal magistrate determined that the Reahards had exhausted their state administrative
remedies and concluded that the claim was ripe for federal court disposition. Id. A jury awarded
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The requirements that the governmental entity make a settlement
offer and identify the uses to which property may be put is intended
to change the way regulators deal with land use issues. The Act is
intended to shift the focus from whether a proposed use is allowable
to what uses are allowable. In this regard, regulators may seek options
in a more cooperative way, which could accommodate an owner's
wishes while achieving the public policy objectives of underlying sta-
tutes, rules, ordinances, or regulations applied to the owner's real
property. 70
2. Commencement and Conduct of a Civil Action
If the governmental entity does not make a bona fide offer to settle
the issue, or if the landowner rejects the settlement offer and ripeness
decision, the landowner may file a claim in circuit court 180 days after
filing the written claim.' 71 The court will decide whether the land-
owner is entitled to compensation, 17 and, if so, a jury will decide the
amount. 1
73
a. Jurisdiction and Venue
The Harris Act specifies that the claim must be brought in circuit
court, and there is no minimum jurisdictional amount. 174 Venue for
this proceeding is the county where the real property is located. 7
the Reahards $700,000 plus accrued interest. Id.
Lee County appealed. Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (11 th Cir. 1992). Reversing the
trial court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the magistrate
had misapplied the test for regulatory takings. Id. at 1134. The Eleventh Circuit then issued an
addendum opinion, instructing the magistrate to address the issue of ripeness. Reahard v. Lee
County, 978 F.2d 1212, 1213 (11th Cir. 1992).
On remand, the magistrate again held that all state remedies had been exhausted and rein-
stated the jury verdict. Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1414 (1Ith Cir. 1994). Again, Lee
County appealed. Id. Again, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court, holding that state
administrative remedies had not been exhausted. Id. at 1418. Again, the Eleventh Circuit re-
manded the case, 'this time with directions to remand the case to the state circuit court from
which it had been originally removed. Id.
The Reahards' petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied.
Reahard v. Lee County, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995).
170. The Harris Act ripeness process fulfills at least one of the functions of the judicial
ripeness policy by recognizing that regulatory decisions are subject to change based on input
from various and competing interests, and thus provides for administrative or political resolu-
tion of disputes. See Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County, 641 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. 4th DCA
1994).
171. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a), (b) (1995).
172. Id. § 70.001(6)(a).
173. Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
174. Id. § 70.001(5)(b).
175. Id.
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b. Joinder
The landowner must serve the complaint on the head of each gov-
ernmental entity making a settlement offer and ripeness decision. 76
This provision contemplates that each governmental entity whose ac-
tions contributed to the alleged inordinate burden had received a copy
of the claim during the notice period, either by election of the land-
owner or at the instigation of a governmental entity.' 77
c. Determination of Inordinate Burden
In the action, the court first must determine whether there has been
an existing use or a vested right to a specific use of the real property.
Second, the court must determine whether an existing use or vested
right has been "inordinately burdened" by the governmental action. 78
In determining whether the governmental action constitutes an inor-
dinate burden, the court must consider and apply the standards set
forth in the Harris Act as well as the governmental entity's settlement
offer and ripeness decision. 179
A governmental entity may avail itself of the opportunity to put its
last, best offer forward in the settlement offer and ripeness decision.
This is intended to allow the governmental entity to relieve an inordi-
nate burden and perhaps avoid litigation. If litigation ensues, it af-
fords the governmental entity an opportunity to present the court with
an offer perhaps more reasonable than the initial governmental ac-
tion. Accordingly, the determination to be made by the court, in ef-
fect, is whether the last, best offer by the governmental entity, if
accepted, would constitute an inordinate burden.
If the actions of more than one governmental entity are at issue,
and the entities are parties to the proceeding, the court must appor-
tion responsibility among them. 80 Significantly, the apportionment
must occur before the valuation issue is addressed. 8' The Harris Act
expressly provides that the apportionment must not be on a pro rata
basis, but rather on the basis of "the percentage of responsibility each
176. Id.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
178. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(a) (1995).
179. Id. In determining whether there has been an inordinate burden, only the final settle-
ment offer and ripeness decision are admissible; proposed settlement offers, ripeness decisions,
and negotiations are inadmissible for these purposes. Id. § 70.00](6)(c)3.
180. Id. § 70.001(6)(a).
181. Id.
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such governmental entity bears with respect to the inordinate bur-
den.'' 152
d. Interlocutory Appeal
Before the issue is submitted to the jury for an award of compensa-
tion, a governmental entity may take an interlocutory appeal of the
court's determination that there has been an inordinate burden." 3 The
circuit court may stay the proceedings during the pendency of the in-
terlocutory appeal, but the statute expressly provides that a stay is not
automatic upon the filing of an interlocutory appeal.
8 4
If the governmental entity prevails in the interlocutory appeal, then
the action is at an end, and the landowner must pay the governmental
entity's attorney's fees and costs under conditions specified by the
statute. 8 5 If the governmental entity does not prevail in the interlocu-
tory appeal, the circuit court is directed to award the landowner his
attorney's fees and costs incurred in the interlocutory appeal.8 6 In ad-
dition, the landowner will receive prejudgment interest on his compen-
sation for the period of delay occasioned by the interlocutory
appeal. 17
e. Attorney's Fees and Costs
Attorney's fees and costs are recoverable from the governmental en-
tity if the landowner prevails on the liability issue, whether in the first
phase of the proceeding or on appeal, if the circuit court finds the
governmental entity did not make a bona fide offer which would have
resolved the landowner's claim during the 180-day notice period.8 8
Among other things, this standard requires the circuit court to de-
termine whether the governmental entity acted in good faith in
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. But see FLA. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(2) (providing for automatic stay upon appeal by a
government agency).
The Harris Act contains language that arguably contradicts the authority of the court to pro-
ceed with the compensation phase of the proceeding notwithstanding an interlocutory appeal. It
states that the court is to impanel a jury to determine compensation "following the resolution of
any interlocutory appeal." FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(b) (1995). This phrase should be read as
meaning the circuit court must proceed with the compensation phase following an interlocutory
appeal in favor of the landowner, unless that phase has otherwise been commenced during the
pendency of the appeal.
185. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(c)2 (1995).
186. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)1.
187. Id. § 70.001(6)(b) (providing that the landowner will receive "prejudgment interestfrom
the date the claim was presented to the governmental entity or entities") (emphasis added).
188. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)l.
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making its settlement offer. 8 9 However, the court is not required to
evaluate the terms of the settlement offer from the perspective of the
landowner or otherwise. 190 If more than one governmental entity is
responsible for the inordinate burden, the award of attorney's fees
and costs shall be apportioned among them on the basis of their per-
centage of responsibility for the inordinate burden. 19'
This provision does not address the prospect that the landowner
would prevail after rejecting a bona fide settlement offer; in that situ-
ation, the landowner would have to pay his own attorney's fees and
costs, unless there was another basis for an award by the court. 192
If the governmental entity prevails on the liability issue in the first
phase of the proceeding or through an appeal, it may recover attor-
ney's fees and costs from the landowner.1 93 In that situation, the Har-
ris Act specifies that the governmental entity or entities shall receive
attorney's fees and costs if
the property owner did not accept a bona fide settlement offer,
including the ripeness decision, which reasonably would have
resolved the claim fairly to the property owner if the settlement offer
had been accepted by the property owner, based upon the knowledge
available to the governmental entity or entities and the property
owner during the 180-day-notice period.94
In this circumstance, the court must determine whether the govern-
mental entity acted in good faith in making its settlement offer. 95
However, unlike the situation when the landowner prevails, when de-
termining an award of attorney's fees and costs after the govern-
mental entity has prevailed, the circuit court also must determine
whether the settlement offer "reasonably would have resolved the
claim fairly to the property owner."'' 1 In other words, it must evalu-
ate the terms of the settlement offer. In doing so, it may utilize only
information available to both parties during the 18CF-day notice
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The Harris Act does not address an award of attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing
landowner where one of two or more governmental entities responsible for the inordinate burden
made a settlement offer in good faith but another did not. In that circumstance, one solution
would be to award the landowner the proportion of her attorney's fees and costs attributable to
the governmental entity which did not act in good faith, based on the percentage of its responsi-
bility for the burden. See id. § 70.001(6)(a), (b).
192. See id. § 70.001(6)(c).
193. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)2.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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period; 97 thus, new information developed by the governmental entity
or landowner for purposes of the litigation may not be utilized by the
court to evaluate the terms of the settlement offer for purposes of
determining an award of attorney's fees and costs.
The Harris Act does not authorize an award of attorney's fees and
costs to a prevailing governmental entity if it did not make its settle-
ment offer in good faith or if it offered, on the basis of information
then available, settlement terms which would not have fairly resolved
the matter. 191 In those circumstances, the governmental entity will ab-
sorb its own attorney's fees and costs.
These provisions increase the importance of the decisions made by
the parties during the 180-day notice period; they create powerful in-
centives for the governmental entity to make a fair settlement offer
and for the landowner to take it. Because of the high cost of litiga-
tion, both landowning and governmental clients will be more likely to
engage in a dispassionate analysis of a Harris Act claim.
f Determination of Compensation
If the court determines that the governmental action has inordi-
nately burdened the landowner's property, it must impanel a jury for
the second phase of this bifurcated proceeding. 99 The jury must deter-
mine the compensation to be awarded to the landowner. 200
The Harris Act prescribes the measure of the landowner's damages
as follows:
The award of compensation shall be determined by calculating the
difference in the fair market value of the real property, as it existed
at the time of the governmental action at issue, as though the owner
had the ability to attain the reasonable investment-backed
expectation or was not left with uses that are unreasonable,
whichever the case may be, and the fair market value of the real
property, as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue,
as inordinately burdened, considering the settlement offer together
with the ripeness decision, of the governmental entity or entities.20'
197. Id. Any proposed settlement offer or proposed ripeness decision and any negotiations
or rejections with respect to the formulation of the settlement offer and ripeness decision are
admissible in the proceeding only for the purpose of determining attorney's fees and costs. Id. §
70,001(6)(c)3.
198. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)2.
199. Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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In fixing compensation, the jury may not consider any business dam-
ages suffered by the landowner; however, the Harris Act requires a
reasonable award of prejudgment interest from the date the claim was
presented for purposes of initiating the 180-day notice period. 202
Because the Harris Act requires the award of compensation to take
into account the settlement offer and ripeness decision, 203 compensa-
tion is not necessarily calculated on the basis of the governmental enti-
ty's original action, but rather with respect to the last, best offer of
the governmental entity.20 Thus, the landowner's appraisal utilized at
the outset of the 180-day notice period will not necessarily address all
the issues which the jury will weigh in determining compensation.
3. Final Judgment
The Harris Act contemplates that any determination and valuation
issues will be concluded in a final judgment entered by the court.0 5
The court is given specific responsibilities to ensure that both the gov-
ernmental entity and the landowner receive their intended benefits."
a. Court's Authority To Grant Relief
The court may enter "any orders necessary to effectuate the pur-
poses of" the Harris Act and has broad authority to make final deter-
minations to effectuate the relief available under the Harris Act. 2°7
This authority is important for the resolution of litigated claims, im-
plementation of pre-suit settlements, and upholding any pre-suit set-
tlements against collateral attacks.
b. Rights Acquired by the Governmental Entity
By operation of law, the government entity which pays the compen-
sation receives the right, title, and interest in rights of use for which
compensation is paid. 08 The governmental entity may hold, sell, or
otherwise dispose of these development rights. 209 When the court has
awarded compensation, it will determine the form and recipient of the
rights and the terms of their acquisition.2 10
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)3.
206. Id. § 70.001(7)(a).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 70.001(7)(b).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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C. Limitations and Exceptions
The seemingly broad sweep of the Harris Act is deceptive because
the new judicial remedy is subject to limitations and exceptions which
will curtail its use in practice.
1. As-Applied Challenges Only
The Harris Act authorizes compensation only for as-applied chal-
lenges to governmental actions. This limitation can been seen in sev-
eral provisions. 2 1 For example, the statement of legislative intent
makes clear that the Harris Act provides compensation "when a new
law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in
the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property.' '212
Accordingly, the Harris Act may not be used to bring a facial chal-
lenge to a statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance; the governmental
entity must specifically apply the statute, rule, regulation, or ordi-
nance to the owner's property in order for the owner to have a Harris
Act claim.
As discussed in the working group which drafted the legislation,
there are many examples of governmental action which may restrict or
limit existing uses or a vested right to a specific use and therefore pro-
vide a basis for Harris Act relief. These include downzoning, applica-
tion of a new coastal construction control line to restrict development,
imposition of upland preservation requirements to protect wildlife
habitats, and land use restrictions to protect wellfields.
2. Federal Programs
The Harris Act does not apply to actions by any governmental en-
tity otherwise covered when it is exercising the powers of the United
States or its agencies through a formal federal delegation. 23
Accordingly, actions by the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection based on implementation of portions of the federally dele-
gated National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) pro-
gram are not subject to relief under the Harris Act. 21 4 If the federal
government delegates the authority to administer the section 404
211. Id. § 70.001(l), (9), (11), (12).
212. Id. § 70.001(1) (emphasis added).
213. Id. § 70.001(3)(c).
214. Id. § 403.0885; id. § 403.08851.
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wetlands permitting program to the states, 2 5 state action under this
permitting program arguably would be exempt from Harris Act
claims.
3. Temporary Impacts
Under the Act, temporary impacts to land do not constitute an in-
ordinate burden for which the governmental entity must provide com-
pensation to the owner.21 6 Therefore, the adverse effects of a valid,
time-limited moratorium would not be actionable under the Harris
Act.
This exception also creates an opportunity for a governmental en-
tity to avoid paying the owner compensation for an action which con-
stitutes an inordinate burden, so long as the burden is promptly
removed from the owner's property. Of course, if the burden
amounted to a taking under constitutional standards, the govern-
mental entity would still be required to compensate the owner. 2 7
4. Public Nuisances at Common Law and Noxious Uses
An inordinate burden does not include impacts to real property
which result from "governmental abatement, prohibition, prevention,
or remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a noxious use
of private property. 2 18 This exception is one of the principal provi-
sions intended to ensure that the Harris Act does not bring an end to
Florida's efforts to protect its environment and manage its growth.
Because the exception is couched in elastic terms, its scope will be the
subject of continuing discussion and litigation.
The portion of the exception grounded on public nuisafice is dy-
namic because the common law is "not a fixed body of well-defined
rules embodied in the written records of this or the mother country,
but is rather a method of juristic thought or manner of treating legal
questions worked out from time to time by the wisdom of man-
kind."2 19 As the Florida Supreme Court has opined with respect to the
common law, "its ever present fluidity enables it to meet and adjust
215. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988); see also Martin R. Dix & Scott Denson, Florida's Assumption
of Federal Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Clearing the Permitting Stream Bed or Muddying Ad-
ministrative Waters, 67 FLA. B.J. 56 (Apr. 1993).
216. But see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(holding compensable under the Fifth Amendment temporary regulatory takings which deny a
landowner all use of his property).
217. Id.
218. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995).
219. Orr v. State, 176 So. 510, 513 (Fla. 1937).
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itself to shifting conditions and new demands."' ' 0 Thus, this is not a
static exception embracing only those public nuisances at common law
as of the effective date of the Harris Act, but rather an exception for
those activities which are now or will come to be understood in the
future as public nuisances. 2 '
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right com-
mon to the general public. 22 A public nuisance "violates public rights,
subverts public order, decency, or morals, or causes inconvenience or
damage to the public generally."223 By contrast, private nuisances are
torts that involve the invasion of an interest in the private use or en-
joyment of land, whether intentional or not.Y Thus, this exception to
the Harris Act may be invoked if the activity which is the subject of
the governmental action violates a right or interest of the general pub-
lic. 225
A "noxious use of private property" is one which does not neces-
sarily rise to the level of a public nuisance, although it has the poten-
tial to inflict injury upon the community. It has commonly been used
220. State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1973).
221. The Legislature has statutorily declared numerous uses or activities to be public nuis-
ances.
222. BLACK'S LAw DicTiONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990).
223. Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 1972).
224. Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla.
1953).
225. The Legislature has supplemented judicial determinations of public nuisances with stat-
utory declarations of public nuisances. FLA. STAT. § 125.563(2) (1995) (altering lake shores and
levels by dumping and similar activities); id. § 161.052 (coastal construction without permit); id.
§ 316.077(4) (signage in certain locations); id. § 327.53(7) (discharging raw sewage from vessels);
id. § 335.092(3)(a) (signage within 500 feet of Everglades Parkway); id. § 339.241(3) (maintain-
ing junkyards within 1,000 feet of federal-aid highway); id. § 370.15(5)(e) (unattended shrimp
traps in public areas); id. § 372.98(4) (possessing or selling nutria without license); id. § 373.433
(stormwater management system in violation of rules); id. § 386.041(l) (listed conditions injuri-
ous to health); id. §§ 388.011(9), .291(3) (conditions which breed mosquitoes and flies in annoy-
ing numbers); id. § 479.105(1) (unpermitted signs adjacent to state or federal highway); id. §
514.06 (operation of swimming pool in violation of law); id. § 550.255 (horse and dog racing for
prizes without pari-mutuel license); id. § 585.15 (pest or disease of animals under state rules); Id.
§ 593.116(3) (cotton plants not destroyed after notice of assessment); id. § 823 (bonfires, dis-
eased animals, houses of ill repute, improperly discarded white goods, smoke in elevators, dere-
lict vessels, sale of controlled substances or obscene materials, releasing unsterilized cats and
dogs from shelters).
Thus, one issue in construing this Harris Act exception is whether it includes statutory public
nuisances. At least one state court has opined that a legislature by statute may "change the
common law as to nuisances, and may move the line either way, as to make things nuisances
which were not so, or to make things lawful that were nuisances." Commonwealth v. Parks, 30
N.E. 174, 175 (1892) (emphasis added). Under this theory, statutorily declared public nuisances
become part of the common law of nuisance. Conversely, an argument can be made that the
reference to a "public nuisance at common law" excludes statutorily defined nuisances under
principles of statutory construction. Ultimately, the issue may be academic because this excep-
tion also reaches "noxious uses of private property."
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to describe odiferous activities which may constitute a public
nuisance, 26 as well as activities akin to private nuisances. 227 And, of
course, it was used in early takings cases to describe land uses whose
proscription was not compensable under some circumstances. 221
Taken together, these terms and the case law which has given them
meaning do not establish a clearly defined exception. Instead, they
provide commonly accepted guideposts for determining land uses and
activities which may be subjected to an inordinate burden without
compensation under the Harris Act.
5. Relief Under the Harris Act
Impacts to real property caused by governmental action to grant
relief under the Harris Act do not constitute an inordinate burden on
another landowner's property.2 9 This exception is intended to encour-
age governmental entities to grant relief to a landowner without con-
cern that doing so will result in a Harris Act claim by another
landowner who contends the relief granted to the first landowner
amounts to an inordinate burden on the second landowner's property.
6. Mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution
The Harris Act expressly provides that it is not intended to supplant
or preclude any form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that
may be agreed to by the parties and is lawfully available for resolution
of a claim.20 For example, arbitration, mediation, and other alterna-
tives to litigation are still available, and "governmental entities are
encouraged to utilize such methods to augment or facilitate" the
availability of relief under the Harris Act. 2 1 The most logical oppor-
tunities for doing so would be during the 180-day notice period.
226. E.g., Farrugia v. Frederick, 344 So. 2d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (upholding
denial of permit to construct canal because waters would become stagnant and noxious); Lee v.
Florida Pub. Utils. Co., 145 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962) (calling fumes expelled by
diesel-powered electrical generating units noxious).
227. E.g., Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1954) (cemeteries and funeral homes located
in residential areas); Mercer v. Brown, 190 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (maintaining animal
reduction plants); Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yancey & Sons Dairy, Inc., 438 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983) (maintaining cesspools); Town of Surfside v. County Line Land Co., 340 So. 2d 1287 (Fla.
3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1977) (failing to control garbage dump).
228. In early takings cases, the terms nuisance and noxious use were often used interchange-
ably. E.g., Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 172 (1915) (livery stable); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (brewery). However, takings cases should not necessarily be relied upon
to determine the scope of this exception to the Harris Act, section 70.001(9), Florida Statutes, so
this authority is of limited value in determining the scope of this exception.
229. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(9) (1995).
230. Id. § 70.001(8).
231. Id.
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7. Transportation
The Harris Act does not apply to governmental actions which in-
volve operating, maintaining, or expanding transportation facilities.
23 2
Furthermore, the Act does not affect existing law regarding eminent
domain relating to transportation.
211
The Florida Statutes define "transportation facility" as "any
means for the transportation of people and property from place to
place which is constructed, operated, or maintained in whole or in
part from public funds. ' 3 4 The statutes have also defined it as "the
property or property rights, both real and personal, of a type used for
the establishment of public transportation systems which have hereto-
fore been, or may hereafter be, established by public bodies for the
transportation of people and property from place to place.
235
Accordingly, aside from not disturbing the law of eminent domain
as it relates to public acquisition of right-of-way for a highway, the
Harris Act would not apply to such governmental actions as the grant
or denial of access permits to state roads under the State Highway
System Access Management Act. 23 6 Depending upon the circum-
stances, similar regulatory actions by local governments could be ex-
empt from Harris Act claims.
8. Statute of Limitations
In order for a subsequent cause of action to be brought in circuit
court, a claim must be presented to the governmental entity within
one year after the new statute, rule, ordinance, or regulation is ap-
plied to the landowner's property. 7 If a landowner elects to take ad-
vantage of lawfully available administrative or judicial remedies prior
to seeking relief under the Harris Act, the time for bringing the Harris
Act claim is tolled until the conclusion of those other proceedings.
2 8
9. Sovereign Immunity
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state, its agencies,
and its political subdivisions may not be sued absent a waiver of the
232. Id. § 70.001(10).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 334.03(3 1). This definition is applicable to the Florida Transportation Code. Id. §
334.03.
235. id. § 163.566(11). The accompanying definition of "public transportation" refers to
common carriers such as trains and buses. Id. § 163.566(8).
236. Id. §§ 335.18-.188.
237. Id. § 70.001(11).
238. Id.
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doctrine by statute or constitutional amendment. 3 9 A waiver must be
clear, specific, and unambiguous.2 40 The Harris Act expressly author-
izes lawsuits against governmental entities 24' and thus constitutes a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
The Harris Act provides that it is not intended to affect the sover-
eign immunity of government. 2 2 This provision should be construed
as meaning only that, by enactment of the Harris Act, the Legislature
has not waived or otherwise affected the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity except to the extent that the Harris Act authorizes claims to be
brought against the state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions.
This provision should not be construed to impose additional statutory
requirements beyond those in the Harris Act.
10. Grandfathering
Finally, and most significantly, the Harris Act is strictly a forward-
looking measure, 43 with an effective date of October 1, 1995.1" It ap-
plies only to specific actions of a governmental entity based on a stat-
ute enacted after the final adjournment of the Legislature on May 11,
1995,24 5 or a rule, regulation, or ordinance adopted after that date.
239. Arundel Corp. v. Griffin, 103 So. 422, 424 (Fla. 1925); McWhorter v. Pensacola &
A.R. Co., 5 So. 129 (Fla. 1888).
240. Manatee County v. Town of Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1978).
241. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13. Although the Harris Act does not use the phrase "waives
its sovereign immunity" or similar language, it expressly authorizes an owner who has met cer-
tain conditions precedent to "fil[e] an action under this section against a governmental entity."
FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a) (1995).
242. Id. § 70.001(13).
243. The statement of legislative intent expressly provides that it addresses only situations
involving "a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance." Id. § 70.001(l) (emphasis added).
244. Id. § 6. Even before it became legally effective, the Harris Act was the subject of great
interest in the legal community, including the courts. Taylor v. Village of North Palm Beach,
659 So. 2d 1167, 1173 n.4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); City of Riviera Beach v. Shillingburg, 659 So.
2d 1174, 1182 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
245. The term "enact" as employed in the Harris Act means final passage by both houses of
the Legislature in the identical form. Thus, the final act in a bill becoming a law-signature by
the Governor or the expiration of the requisite time period without veto-is not necessary in
order for an enactment to be excluded from the purview of the Harris Act under this exception.
In the legislative process, when a bill is ordered enrolled following final passage by both
houses, the first line of the title, "A bill to be entitled," is removed, leaving the measure to read,
"An act relating to .... " See FLA. STAT. § 11.07 (1995). The measure is then transmitted to the
Governor, whose role is to determine whether the act should become a law.
Several references in the Florida Constitution to the process of enactment support this conclu-
sion. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. Il, § 9 (laws shall take effect 60 days after final adjournment
"of the session of the legislature in which enacted"); id. art. V, § 2(a) (court rules "may be
repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote" of both chambers).
References in the Florida Statutes also support this conclusion. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1.04
(1995) ("[almendments enacted during the same session"); id. § 11.075 ("[p]rior to the
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Governmental actions based on a statute enacted before that date, or
a rule, regulation, or ordinance adopted before that date, or one for-
mally noticed for adoption before that date are not subject to claims
under the Harris Act.246
An action based on a subsequent amendment to a grandfathered
statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance may be a basis for a Harris Act
claim, but "only to the extent that the application of the amendatory
language imposes an inordinate burden apart from" the grandfath-
ered statute, rule, ordinance, or regulationY47
This provision provides perhaps the most significant and, for land-
owners, the most controversial limitation regarding the availability of
this new remedy. It is intended to prevent application of the Harris
Act to governmental actions based on environmental protection and
growth management programs which predate May 11, 1995, on the
ground that they were put into place by government agencies in the
expectation that landowners would be owed compensation for adverse
regulatory decisions only if those decisions rose to the level of a con-
stitutional taking. 24
The more problematic aspect of this exception is the limitation
which authorizes compensation awards on the basis of post-May 11,
1995 amendments to pre-May 11, 1995 statutes, rules, regulations, or
ordinances.249 Applying this provision in practice is likely to prove dif-
ficult.
D. Intent and Construction
In light of the unique purposes and intent of the Harris Act, a court
should not necessarily construe it using the case law regarding takings
claims under the United States and Florida constitutions if the govern-
mental action does not rise to the level of a taking.250 In addition, the
Harris Act is distinct from section 2 of the legislation, which estab-
lishes a nonjudicial settlement and expedited hearing procedure. 2 1 The
two are not necessarily to be construed in pari materia 5 2
enactment of any general or special law"); id. § 11.076(1) ("[a]ny general law, enacted by the
Legislature"); id. § 11.242(5)(c) (general laws "enacted by any current session of the Legisla-
ture"); id. § 11.242(5)(i) (expired, obsolete, invalid and other laws omitted by reviser's bills "en-
acted by the Legislature").
246. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(12) (1995).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. § 70.001(9).
251. For a discussion on the non-judicial settlement and expedited hearing procedure, see
infra part IV.
252. FLA. STAT. § 70.80 (1995).
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E. Summary
The Harris Act creates a new judicial remedy for landowners that,
in some respects, bears a striking resemblance to existing remedies un-
der the law of takings. Each case will be an ad hoc, fact-intensive
inquiry to determine whether a particular governmental action in-
trudes too far into the landowner's domain. When it does, compensa-
tion will be due.
In all likelihood, however, the chief effect of the Harris Act will not
be an explosion of litigation or a rash of damage awards. Rather, it
will produce a sense of caution on the part of the regulators who are
entrusted with the responsibility of protecting Florida's environment
and managing its growth. That was the intention of the new law's leg-
islative sponsors.253 Already there is evidence that the Harris Act has
had that effect, both among state agencies 254 and local governments. 2 5
The Harris Act was not intended to chill all new regulation, but care-
ful consideration should be given to whether the Harris Act is impli-
cated in proposed governmental actions. In a period of public
skepticism about government action, such consideration ought to help
restore confidence in Florida's regulatory system.
IV. FLORIDA LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ACT
Section 2 of the 1995 property rights legislation is the Florida Land
Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act (Special Master
Law). 2 56 The Special Master Law attempts to resolve growth manage-
ment and environmental permitting disputes at the state, regional, and
local levels by establishing an informal, nonjudicial settlement and
253. James Martinez, New Law Will Let Property Owners Sue State Over Regulatory
Losses, TALL. DEM., May 19, 1995, at BI, B2 (quoting Rep. Dean Saunders, Dem., Lakeland, as
saying: "I think folks are ready for government to think twice before they just adopt a regula-
tion. That's part of the intention here-to think about the impact you could potentially have on
a property owner.").
254. The Department of Environmental Protection delayed plans, at least temporarily, to
declare certain waters in Collier County as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) with a heightened
degree of regulatory protection. Emma Ross, State Stills Wiggins Water Protections, NAPLaS
DAILY NEws, Aug. 7, 1995, at Dl. It cited a need to consider the implications of the Harris Act
on the OFW designation, even though the new law was not in effect. Id.
255. In Palm Beach County, for example, local officials scaled down an ambitious plan to
utilize regulatory measures to prevent development of certain farmlands in western Palm Beach
County. George Bennett, Ag Reserve Buyout Plan Cut in Half, PALM BEACH POST, June 14,
1995, at B1. They blamed the Harris Act in part for forcing their retreat, even though the new
law was not yet in effect. Id.
256. FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (1995).
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expedited hearing procedure overseen by a neutral third party. 217 The
Special Master Law provides a landowner with an opportunity for ne-
gotiated relief and an impartial advisory hearing in disputes involving
adverse consequences from a decision on a "development order" or
an "enforcement action" by a "governmental entity. ' 258 This new
procedure integrates aspects of other ADR processes together into a
new form of proceeding. 25 9
The Special Master Law is based on the 1993 recommendations of
the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission I1260 and typifies
the increasing reliance on ADR techniques to address controversies in-
volving land use and environmental regulation. 26' Unlike the Harris
Act, the Special Master Law may be invoked in disputes arising from
decisions based on statutes, rules, ordinances, or regulations predating
May 11, 1995.262
A. Definitions
As with the Harris Act, the Special Master Law's definitions for
particular terms are crucial for understanding the scope of this meas-
ure. Again, however, the two measures are intended to be interpreted
and applied by their own terms and are not necessarily to be construed
in pari materia. 263
1. Development Order
A "development order" means any order or notice of proposed
agency action which grants, grants with conditions, or denies an appli-
cation for a "development permit." 26 Rezoning of a specific parcel of
land is expressly included; however, actions by state agencies and local
257. Id. For a critique of the "colonization" of ADR by the legal profession, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted
or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991). For an alternative view, see James J.
Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 47 (1991).
258. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(3) (1995).
259. For a discussion of some of the practice issues raised by this hybrid process, see Michael
K. Lewis, The Special Master as Mediator, 12 SETOm HALL LEGOS. J. 75 (1988); Lawrence E.
Susskind, Court-Appointed Masters as Mediators, I NEGOTIATION J. 295 (1985).
260. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-150 (June 4, 1993).
261. For a discussion of the ADR procedures adopted for the local comprehensive planning
program, see infra text accompanying notes 382-96.
262. See FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (1995).
263. Id. § 70.80. This statement of legislative intent may prove problematic when it comes to
a term which receives an identical definition in both statutes. Compare id. § 70.001(3)(g) with id.
§ 70.51 (2)(g) (definition of "land").
264. Id. § 70.51(2)(a).
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governments relating to comprehensive plan amendments are ex-
cluded .26
2. Development Permit
A "development permit" means any "building permit, zoning per-
mit, subdivision approval, certification, special exception, variance,"
or other action of local government, as well as any permit under state
law which authorizes the development of real property.2" This defini-
tion is based upon the definition of the same term in section
163.3164(8), Florida Statutes, but is expanded to include permits is-
sued by state and regional agencies. 267
3. Development
The Special Master Law does not define the term "development."
Therefore, the definition of development set forth in section 380.04,
Florida Statutes, should be applied in this context.2  However, for
two reasons the exclusions from that definition should not be applied
in the context of the Special Master Law. 269 First, the exceptions are
expressly intended to apply "for [the] purpose of this chapter," mean-
ing Chapter 380, Florida Statutes.2 70 Second, the Legislature intended
the Special Master Law to serve a remedial purpose and be liberally
construed to that end.271
4. Owner
An "owner" means a person with a legal or equitable interest in
real property who filed an application for a development permit and
received a development order.2"2 It also means one who holds legal or
equitable title to real property which is the subject of an enforcement
action. 273 A person may include a natural person, firm, association,
joint venture, partnership, estate, trust, business trust, syndicate, fi-
duciary, corporation, or other group or combination. 274
265. Id.
266. Id. § 70.51(2)(b).
267. See id. § 163.3164(8) (defining development as "the carrying out of any building activ-
ity or mining operation, the making of any material change in the use or appearance of any
structure or land, or the dividing of land into three or more parcels").
268. See id. § 380.04.
269. Id. § 380.04(3).
270. Id.
271. Id. § 70.51(29).
272. Id. §70.51(2)(d).
273. Id.
274. Id. § 1.01.
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Unlike the Harris Act, the definition of "owner" in the Special
Master Law expressly includes a person with an equitable, as opposed
to a legal, interest in land. 2"1 Furthermore, governmental entities are
not expressly excluded. Accordingly, a school board could request a
special master proceeding on a land use decision by a local govern-
ment with regulatory authority over land.
5. Governmental Entity
The Special Master Law does not include the United States or any
federal agency as a "governmental entity. '27 6 Therefore, a landowner
cannot request a special master proceeding from a federal agency such
as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. On the other hand, un-
like the Harris Act, the Special Master Law does not expressly carve
out an exception for actions by state, regional, or local governmental
entities when acting under a formal delegation of federal powers. 277
6. Land or Real Property
The term "land" or "real property" means land and "includes any
appurtenances and improvements to the land, including any other rel-
evant real property in which the owner had a relevant interest.
278
This definition is identical to the Harris Act's definition;2 79 however, it
is broader in scope because the definition of owner in the Special Mas-
ter Law reaches both legal and equitable interests in land. 2 0 There-
fore, the definition of land in the Special Master Law should be
interpreted to encompass the owner's entire property, meaning rele-
vant land in which the owner has either a legal or equitable interest,
and any structure or improvement on the land, regardless of whether
it customarily would be regarded as part of the real property.
7. Enforcement Action
The Special Master Law does not define the term "enforcement ac-
tion," but the definition should encompass actions by state, regional,
and local government agencies to enforce environmental protection
and growth management laws as well as the terms of individual devel-
opment orders. Because, as a matter of law, the definition of
275. Compare id. § 70.51(2Xd) with id. § 70.001(3)(f).
276. Id. § 70.51(2)(f.
277. See id. § 70.001(3)(c).
278. Id. § 70.51(2)(g).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 116-123.
280. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(2)(d) (1995).
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"governmental entity" does not exclude state, regional, or local gov-
ernmental entities exercising federally delegated authority,," an action
by a state, regional, or local agency enforcing a federally delegated
program could be the basis for a special master proceeding.
8. Unreasonable or Unfairly Burdens
Unlike the Harris Act, which provides an ample, if flexible, defini-
tion for the operative legal standard, 282 the Special Master Law does
not define the term "unreasonable or unfairly burdens" which must
be applied by the special master to determine a landowner's rights. 23
Deliberately opting to omit a definition of the term, the drafters chose
to rely on the common sense judgment of the special master selected
by the parties themselves.
The Special Master Law does identify factors the special master
may use to determine whether a development order or an enforcement
action is unreasonable or unfairly burdens an owner's property.2 4
These factors are 1) the history of the property; 2) the history of de-
velopment and use of the property; 3) the history of land use and en-
vironmental controls on the property; 4) the present nature and extent
of the property; 5) the reasonable expectations of the owner; 6) the
public purpose to be achieved by the development order or enforce-
ment action at issue; 7) the uses authorized for and restrictions im-
posed on similar property; and 8) any additional relevant
information. 215
In the event a settlement is not voluntarily reached by the parties,
the special master may consider the above factors when determining
whether a development order or enforcement action is unreasonable
or unfairly burdensome.2 86 Such a determination will necessarily re-
quire a balancing process.
B. Initiation of Proceeding
A landowner who believes a development order or enforcement ac-
tion is unreasonable or unfairly burdensome may apply for relief un-
der the Special Master Law. 28 7
281. Id. § 70.51(2)(f).
282. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
283. Id. § 70.51(2).
284. Id. § 70.51(18).
285. Id. § 70.51(18)(a)-(g). This list is not inclusive.
286. Id. § 70.51(17)(b).
287. Id. § 70.51(3).
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1. Conditions Precedent
Prior to requesting relief from a local government development or-
der, the landowner must exhaust all local administrative appeals so
long as they do not take longer than four months. 288 If the local ad-
ministrative appeal takes longer than four months, the landowner may
apply for relief four months after commencement whether or not the
local administrative appeal has been concluded. 28 9
2. Request for Relief
In order to commence a special master proceeding, the statute re-
quires that the landowner file a request for relief with the appropriate
governmental entity.29 The filing is intended to be a simple action
without the trappings of most legal proceedings.
a. Filing the Request
The owner must file a written request for relief with the appointed
or elected head of the governmental entity. 29' The request must be
filed within thirty days after receipt of the development order or no-
tice of the governmental action at issue.292 No filing fee may be
charged, and the governmental entity is required to participate in the
proceeding if one is requested. 29 1
b. Contents of Request
The Special Master Law specifies the bare-bones information which
must be included in the request. 29 This information includes 1) a brief
statement of the owner's proposed use of his land; 2) a summary of
the development order or description of the enforcement action, in-
cluding a copy of the development order or documentation of the en-
forcement action, such as a notice of violation; 3) a brief statement of
the impact of the development order or enforcement action "on the
ability of the owner to achieve the proposed use of the property"; and
4) a certification showing on whom copies of the request have been
served.2 95
288. Id. § 70.51(10)(a).
289. Id.
290. Id. § 70.51(4).
291. Id.
292. Id. § 70.51(3).
293. Id. § 70.51(4), (11).
294. Id. § 70.51(6)(a)-(d).
295. Id.
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Although the statute does not require it, sound practice would in-
clude submitting a copy of the development permit application, if one
exists, with the request for relief. Furthermore, an owner would be
well-served by submitting carefully selected information showing how
the governmental action is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the prop-
erty.
c. Effect of Request for Relief
Initiation of a special master proceeding tolls the time to seek judi-
cial review of local development orders and enforcement actions. 296
This filing also tolls the time to seek an administrative hearing under
section 120.57, Florida Statutes, for those agency actions subject to
the Administrative Procedure Act. 2 7 As a consequence, entities
should amend their ordinances and rules regarding the availability of
such judicial and administrative relief to indicate the effect of a re-
quest for relief under the Special Master Law.
3. Waiver of Rights
In any proceeding involving a development order or enforcement
action, initiation of judicial review by a landowner will waive all
rights under the Special Master Law. 291 A landowner's petition for an
administrative proceeding pursuant to section 120.57, Florida Sta-
tutes, whether formal or informal, also waives the landowner's rights
under the Special Master Law. 299
In either circumstance, however, another party to the development
order or enforcement action proceeding could request judicial review
or a section 120.57 proceeding without foreclosing the opportunity for
the landowner to request relief under the Special Master Law. 3  Al-
though perhaps counter-intuitive and certainly unusual, such a situa-
tion would be within the legislative intent to provide this form of
relief for landowners.
4. Parties and Participants
The Special Master Law sets up two categories of those who may
present their interests for consideration in a special master proceeding.
They are "parties" and "participants.""'
296. Id. § 70.51(10)(a).
297. Id. § 70.51(10)(b); id. § 120.57.
298. Id. § 70.51(10)(a).
299. Id. § 70.51(10)(b).
300. Id.
301. Id. § 70.51.
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a. Parties
The parties to the proceeding include the landowner and the govern-
mental entity. 2 The landowner may name more than one govern-
mental entity in the request for relief if the burden is the result of
multiple development orders.303
The special master may join additional governmental entities as par-
ties to the proceeding at the request of the landowner or the govern-
mental entity, if the action at issue is the culmination of a process
involving more than one governmental entity or if it is necessary for a
complete understanding of the issues.3D4 A governmental entity joined
to the proceeding by the special master must participate in both the
mediation and the hearing, if one is held.3 °0 A governmental entity
joined to the proceeding by the special master must also file a re-
sponse to the landowner's request for relief.?0l
b. Participants
Others may participate in the proceeding within limited bounds.3°7
The governmental entity must forward a copy of the landowner's re-
quest to the owners of contiguous real property and certain persons
who participated in proceedings leading up to the development order
or the enforcement action.3°8 These persons may request status as par-
ticipants at the hearing, if one is held, within twenty-one days of re-
ceiving a copy of the request.3 09 In order to be accepted as a
participant, such a person must demonstrate that he is "substantially
affected" by the subject matter of the proceeding.3 10 The special mas-
ter ultimately must determine whether a prospective participant satis-
fies this statutory requirement.3 1'
302. Id. §70.51(11).
303. Id. § 70.51(3).
304. Id. § 70.51(11).
305. Id. ("requiring that those governmental entities so joined shall actively participate in
the procedure").
306. Id. § 70.51(16)(b).
307. Id. § 70.51(12).
308. Id. § 70.51(5).
309. Id. § 70.51(12).
310. Id.
311. A body of case law has developed around this standard as it is utilized in Chapter 120,
Florida Statutes, for determining access to rule challenge proceedings under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See id. §§ 120.54(4), .56. For an in-depth discussion on access to rule challenge
proceedings, see Patricia A. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 967 (1986).
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Such persons will not be classified as parties or intervenors if ac-
cepted into the proceeding.3"2 As a result, they may address only issues
regarding alternatives to the development order or enforcement action
as the alternatives might affect the persons' substantial interests.
3 3
5. Selection of Special Master
The first and most important step after submission of the request
for relief is the selection of the special master. The statute sets forth
several requirements which must be met but leaves important ques-
tions unaddressed.314
a. Jointly Selected
Within ten days of receiving a request for a special master proceed-
ing, the governmental entity must agree with the landowner on the
special master who will conduct the proceeding." 5 The Special Master
Law does not provide guidance on how the parties are to select a spe-
cial master or from what pool of candidates. The working group
which prepared the legislation concluded that it was better to leave
these decisions to each governmental entity and landowner. In addi-
tion, the Special Master Law does not contain a default procedure for
selection of a special master if the parties cannot agree. Fortunately,
the Special Master Law is flexible enough to allow the parties to agree
on a default procedure.11 6
b. Qualifications
The statute sets forth only minimal qualifications for service as a
special master.117 Qualifications include being a Florida resident and
possessing both experience and expertise in mediation. 8 In addition,
one must possess both experience and expertise in at least one of the
following disciplines: "land use and environmental permitting, land
planning, land economics, local and state government organization
and powers, and the law governing the same. 319
312. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(12) (1995).
313. Id.
314. Id. § 70.51(2)(c).
315. Id. § 70.51(4).
316. After failure to agree, one alternative to be considered is agreement on criteria for selec-
tion of a special master, with the selection performed by a neutral organization, such as the
Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium at Florida State University, using those criteria.
317. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(2)(c) (1995).
318. Id.
319. Id. Under a grant from the Florida Department of Community Affairs, the Florida
Conflict Resolution Consortium has initiated a training program for persons seeking to serve as
special masters. The Consortium will maintain a directory of persons who have completed its
training program.
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6. Response to Written Claim
The governmental entity is required to file a response to the request
setting forth the public purpose of the regulations on which the devel-
opment order or enforcement action is based.3 20 A response may in-
clude a request to be dropped from the proceeding. 2' The special
master has authority to decide such a request. 2 In addition, the spe-
cial master may dismiss a request for relief for failing to set forth the
required information.3 23 However, in that circumstance, the special
master must allow the party to file an amended request. 24
C. Conduct of the Proceeding
A special master proceeding has two phases;325 as a result, the spe-
cial master has dual roles. The first phase consists of mediation, dur-
ing which the special master is required to serve as a mediator and
facilitator to assist the parties in attempting to settle the dispute vol-
untarily and without resort to civil or administrative litigation.126
In the second phase, which arises if the parties do not reach a settle-
ment, the special master serves as a neutral information-gatherer.3 7
After receiving information from the parties and other participants at
a public hearing, he must make a nonbinding advisory determination
as to whether the development order or enforcement action at issue is
unreasonable or unfairly burdens the landowner's property and, if so,
may recommend remedies. 21
In keeping with the settlement-oriented nature of the proceeding,
the actions or statements of all persons in both phases of the proceed-
ing are evidence of an offer to compromise.3 29 Therefore, such actions
are inadmissible in any subsequent judicial or administrative proceed-
ing regarding the subject matter of the dispute.3 0 The governmental
entity may adopt procedural guidelines for the conduct of special
320. Id. § 70.51(16)(a).
321. Id. § 70.51(16)(c).
322. Id.
323. Id. § 70.51(8).
324. Id.
325. Id. § 70.51(17)(a), (b).
326. Id. § 70.51(17)(a).
327. Id. § 70.51(17)(b).
328. Id.
329. Id. § 70.51(20).
330. Id.; see also id. § 90.408.
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master proceedings;33" ' however, those guidelines should not compro-
mise the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.
1. Facilitation and Mediation
Because the Special Master Law expressly refers to the first phase of
the proceeding as "mediation, '12 the permissible techniques and pro-
cedures in this phase may be determined by reference to mediation
practice.333
The Special Master Law contains virtually no procedural require-
ments for the mediation phase. Each party must be represented at the
mediation by someone with authority to bind the principal or to rec-
ommend a settlement directly to those with authority to make a bind-
ing decision.3 34 The statute gives the special master broad latitude to
structure the mediation as the exigencies require.335 The statute does
not even prescribe when the mediation must occur in relation to the
hearing, so it is conceivable that a special master could conduct a me-
diation and, if a settlement does not result, conduct a hearing at a
later date, or the special master could conduct the hearing prior to the
mediation in order to resolve factual issues as the basis for a mediated
settlement.
2. Hearing
The special master must conduct a hearing on the dispute no more
than forty-five days after receiving the request for relief, unless the
parties have settled or agreed to a different date.33 6 The special master
must provide notice of the place, date, and time of the hearing.33 7 The
hearing must be held in the county where the property is located.3
Because of its information-gathering function, there are additional
331. Id. § 70.51(28). The Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium, under its contract with
the Department of Community Affairs, has produced Model Procedural Guidelines for use by
governmental entities in implementing the Special Master Law.
332. Id. § 70.51(17)(a). For the statutory definition of "mediation," see id. § 44.1011(2).
333. In authorizing mediation in various judicial proceedings, the Legislature set forth im-
portant statutory policies regarding the conduct of court-ordered mediation. See id. § 44.102.
The law expressly confers judicial immunity on mediators. Id. § 44.107. The Florida Supreme
Court has also established important procedural requirements. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.700-.750.
334. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(17)(a) (1995). The authority of the governmental entity's representa-
tive is an important factor in determining procedural constraints in the mediation phase. See
News-Press Pub. Co. v. Lee County, 570 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
335. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(17) (1995).
336. Id. § 70.51(15)(a).
337. Id. § 70.51(15)(b).
338. Id. § 70.51(15)(a).
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statutory requirements which the special master must follow while
controlling and directing the hearing.3 39
In all respects, the hearing is to be informal and should not require
the services of an attorney.340 The parties are expected to bring to the
hearing "those persons qualified by training or experience necessary
to address issues raised by the request or by the special master and
further qualified to address alternatives, variances, and other types of
modifications to the development order or enforcement action." 34'
The hearing must be open to the public . 42
The special master has specific powers intended to assure that all
relevant information is brought to the hearing .34 At any time he may
require a party or participant to provide additional information.344
The special master may subpoena "any nonparty witnesses in the state
whom the special master believes will aid in the disposition of the mat-
ter. 3 45 By requesting relief under the Special Master Law, the owner
consents to inspection of his property by the special master and the
parties .46
D. Special Master's Recommendation
No later than fourteen days after the hearing, the special master is
required to submit a written recommendation to the parties.3 47 The
special master's recommendation is a public record. 34
1. Settlement
If the parties agree to settle during the mediation or afterward, the
special master must incorporate the settlement in his written
339. Id. § 70.51(17).
340. Id. § 70.51(17).
341. Id. § 70.51(13).
342. Id. § 70.51(17).
343. Id.
344. Id. § 70.51(7).
345. Id. § 70.51(14). The provision granting subpoena power to a special master is vague
compared to the grant to hearing officers of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Compare
id. § 120.58(1) with id. § 70.51(14). That provision sets forth prerequisites for issuance of a
subpoena and provides for payment of fees to certain subpoenaed experts. Id. § 120.58(1)(a), (c).
The Special Master Law would be improved by the addition of such provisions.
346. Id. § 70.51(9).
347. Id. § 70.51(19). The statute does not expressly require that a copy of the written recom-
mendation be provided to participants, but sound practice and fundamental fairness strongly
suggest that they also receive a copy.
The statute does require that the special master provide a copy of his recommendation to the
Florida Department of Legal Affairs. Id. § 70.51(27).
348. Id. § 70.51(20); see id. § 119.07.
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recommendation.149 In that circumstance, no additional findings, de-
terminations, or recommendations by the special master are required
by the statute, although the hearing may suggest additional proposals
the special master may wish to submit to the parties.
2. Without Settlement
If the parties do not agree to settle, the special master must make a
written determination as to whether the development order or enforce-
ment action is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the owner's prop-
erty.Y0 If the circumstances warrant, the special master is expressly
required to make the determination on the basis of the development
order or enforcement action at issue "in combination with the actions
or regulations of other governmental entities." '' This provision re-
flects the reality that the full consequences of one governmental enti-
ty's regulatory actions sometimes are fully felt by a landowner only in
concert with those of another governmental entity.
3. Evaluation of Information Produced at Hearing
The Special Master Law contains seemingly conflicting provisions
regarding the standard to be applied in evaluating the information
produced at the hearing. One passage of the Special Master Law re-
quires the special master to consider "any . . . information produced
at the hearing." 35 2 Another passage requires the special master to limit
his consideration to "information determined relevant by the special
master." 353
349. Id. § 70.51(19)(c). In a circuit court mediation in Florida, by contrast, the settlement
agreement is not necessarily submitted to the court and made public. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(b).
In a family mediation in Florida, a settlement must be filed with the court. FLA. R. Crv. P.
1.740(f).
350. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(19)(a) (1995). This provision is an important difference from that
concerning court-ordered mediation in Florida. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(a) ("[The] mediator
shall report the lack of agreement to the court without comment or recommendation.").
351. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(19)(a) (1995). This provision does not confine the special master to
considering only formal development orders or enforcement actions of other governmental enti-
ties when assessing the combined effect of multiple governmental actions. It is consistent with
the liberal standard for joinder of additional governmental entities. Id. § 70.51(11) ("when a
complete resolution of all relevant issues would require the active participation of more than one
governmental entity").
However, the other governmental actions or regulations must be those of governmental enti-
ties that are parties to the special master proceeding. Id. § 70.51(18) (The special master is to
consider the development order or enforcement action "in conjunction with regulatory efforts of
other governmental parties.") (emphasis added).
352. Id. § 70.51(17)(b).
353. Id. §70.51(18)(h).
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This apparent inconsistency is resolved by the requirement that the
special master "weigh all information offered at the hearing. 35 4 This
last provision indicates that the special master should accept all infor-
mation submitted during the proceeding regardless of relevancy con-
cerns and use it in attempting to facilitate a settlement; but, in
formulating a written recommendation in the absence of a settlement,
the special master may give weight only to relevant information. 55
Among other things, this construction negates the need for the appli-
cation of rules of evidence, which in any event are not authorized by
the Special Master Law and are inconsistent with the notion of an
informal proceeding not requiring counsel. 56
4. Recommendation
If the special master determines after the hearing that the develop-
ment order or enforcement action is not unreasonable or does not un-
fairly burden the property, the recommendation must be that it
r iJ'r~indi ih3 S7 -jthoigb nor furth cdton or gcommendation
by the special master is required by the statute, the special master may
wish to submit proposals to the parties on the basis of information
produced at the hearing.
On the other hand, if the special master determines that the devel-
opment order or enforcement action is unreasonable or unfairly bur-
dens the property, the special master may recommend "one or more
alternatives that protect the public interest served by the development
order or enforcement action" but reduce the burden on the prop-
erty.358 Such a recommendation may be made only with the consent of
the landowner.359
The Special Master Law suggests ten options which are to be con-
sidered in proposing relief for the landowner.)6 They include 1) an
adjustment of land development or permit standards controlling the
use of the land; 2) increases or modifications in the density, intensity,
or use of development areas; 3) transfer of development rights; 4)
land swaps or exchanges; 5) mitigation, including payments instead of
on-site mitigation; 6) location on the least sensitive portion of the
354. Id. § 70.51(17)(c).
.355. Id. §70.51(18)(h).
356. Id. § 70.51(17).
357. Id. § 70.51(19)(a).
358. Id. § 70.51(19)(b).
359. Id. § 70.51(19)(b). In light of the short time periods allowed by the statute, the special
master should ask the landowner to make this election at hearing in the event that a settlement is
not reached.
360. Id.
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property; 7) conditions on the amount of development or use permit-
ted; 8) a requirement that issues be addressed more comprehensively
than the use or uses immediately proposed; 9) issuance of a develop-
ment order, variance, special exception, or other form of extraordi-
nary relief, including withdrawal of an enforcement action; or 10)
public purchase of the owner's property or acquisition of a less-than-
fee-simple interest in it.61 The special master is not limited to propos-
ing only those remedial steps on the statutory menu.
5. Effect of Recommendation
A determination that the development order or enforcement action
is unreasonable or an unfair burden on the owner's property may
serve as an "indication of sufficient hardship" for purposes of a vari-
ance, special exception, or other relief.362 This effect of the recommen-
dation is not dependent upon the governmental entity's response.
A special master's recommendation also may serve as data and
analysis to support a comprehensive plan amendment, but it alone will
not necessarily determine whether the amendment is in compliance as
defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.163 If an amend-
ment to the local comprehensive plan is necessary to implement the
recommendation of a special master, the amendment will not be sub-
ject to the twice yearly limitation when a local government may adopt
plan amendments. 364 Further, the amendment may be adopted pursu-
ant to the streamlined adoption process set forth in section
163.3184(16), Florida Statutes, to implement a comprehensive plan
compliance agreement.3 65
E. Disposition of Recommendation
Upon receipt of a special master's recommendation, the govern-
mental entity has several duties which are intended to bring the pro-
ceeding to a close, either by implementation of a settlement or official
361. Id. § 70.001(4)(c). This list of potential remedies is almost identical to the remedies
proposed for consideration by the governmental entity and the landowner under the Harris Act
during the 180-day notice period. Id. § 70.001(4)(c). See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
The special master's recommendation must be consistent with existing statutes, rules, regula-
tions, and ordinances. See Dep't of Comm'y Aff., CS for HB 863 (1995) Staff Analysis 4 (May
15, 1995) (on file with Dept.).
362. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(25) (1995).
363. Id. § 70.51(26); see id. § 163.3184(l)(b).
364. Id. § 70.51(26).
365. See id. § 163.3184(16).
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actions which are intended to ripen the controversy for judicial re-
view. 36
1. Consistency with Existing Law
Unlike the Harris Act, which authorizes a departure from the spe-
cific terms of existing laws so long as the departure is consistent with
the underlying statutory purpose, the resolution of a dispute through
the Special Master Law must be consistent with applicable growth
management and environmental protection laws. 67 The statute speci-
fies that implementation of a settlement, whether as originally recom-
mended by the special master or as subsequently modified by the
governmental entity, must be "in the ordinary course and consistent
with the rules and procedures of that governmental entity." 3 s This
limitation applies whether the disposition would involve implementa-
tion of a settlement or a recommendation by the special master in the
absence of a settlement. 69
2. Responsibility of Governmental Entity
Within forty-five days of receipt of a special master's recommenda-
tion, the governmental entity must confer with any other involved
government entities and either accept, modify, or reject the special
master's recommendation. 170 An acceptance or modification may be
implemented by development agreement or other action. 371 A failure
366. Id. § 70.51(21).
367. Compare id. § 70.001(4)(d) with id. § 70.51(21).
368. Id. § 70.51(21)(a)-(b). Thus, the governmental entity's ordinary procedural require-
ments would apply to implementation of a settlement. For example, if the dispute involved a
rezoning by a local government and the settlement called for an alteration of the rezoning action
by addition or deletion of a condition, a new development order would have to be adopted to
implement the settlement. That new development order would be subject to normal procedural
requirements. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
This aspect of the Special Master Law ensures that, prior to implementation of a settlement,
the general public as well as affected persons will have access to governmental decisionmakers,
and that the matter will receive appropriate scrutiny. Specifically, it assures the same amount of
due process that neighboring landowners or citizens' groups otherwise would receive and cures
any concerns regarding the flexibility or informality of either the mediation or information-
gathering phases of the proceeding.
369. However, an owner need not "duplicate previous processes in which the owner has
participated in order to effectuate" a decision by the local government to grant a modification,
variance, or special exception as recommended by a special master. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(21)(a)
(1995).
370. Id. § 70.51(21). Within 15 days of its decision, the governmental entity must notify the
Florida Department of Legal Affairs of its disposition of the recommendation in writing. Id. §
70.51(27).
371. See Florida Local Government Development Agreement Act, id. §§ 163.3220-.3243.
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to act on the recommendation within forty-five days constitutes a re-
jection of the recommendation unless the landowner agrees to an ex-
tension.372
If the governmental entity accepts the recommendation or modifica-
tion but the landowner rejects that action or if the governmental en-
tity rejects the recommendation, within thirty days after such a
decision the governmental entity is required to issue a written decision
describing all uses available on the property.3 73 This action is intended
to ripen the owner's claim for purposes of judicial review. 7 4 Whether
or not the local government issues the written decision on uses, the
landowner may file a civil action as soon as the governmental entity
acts on the special master's recommendations.3"
F. Limitations
There are important limitations on the availability of a special mas-
ter proceeding. First, it is available only in as-applied challenges.176
Second, it is not available to an owner who contests an action of ei-
ther state or local governmental entities regarding an amendment to a
local comprehensive plan.377 Third, it is available as of right only for
development orders or enforcement actions on or after October 1,
1995.378 Fourth, it is not intended to replace or supplant other lawfully
available ADR methods. 379
The special master proceeding may not last more than 165 days
without the consent of all parties.8 0 Requesting a special master
proceeding is voluntary for the landowner and is not a condition prec-
edent to any other legal proceeding. 8'
G. Summary
The Special Master Law is a hybrid which combines in a single ex-
pedited proceeding some of the attributes of other ADR methods,
372. Id. § 70.51(21)(c).
373. Id. § 70.51(22).
374. Id. § 70.51(23). It is described as "the last prerequisite to judicial action" unless the
owner initiates a proceeding under section 120.57, Florida Statutes, for agencies subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
375. Id. § 70.51(24).
376. Id. § 70.51(3).
377. Id. § 70.51 (2)(a); see infra notes 382-96 and accompanying text.
378. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(3) (1995). However, subject to approval of all parties and the court,
the statute allows parties to pending judicial proceedings to utilize the special master procedure
to address their dispute, although it does not provide a procedure for doing so. Id. § 70.51(30).
379. Id. § 70.51(29).
380. Id. § 70.51(23).
381. Id. § 70.51(24).
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such as mediation, arbitration, and mini-trials. While the Special Mas-
ter Law is untested and may require legislative adjustments in the fu-
ture, it is beyond question that this is a new body in the ADR
firmament.
V. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
CHAPTER 163 PROGRAM
Because the Special Master Law expressly does not cover actions by
governmental entities relating to local comprehensive plans,8 2 the
1995 property rights legislation creates separate ADR remedies for the
comprehensive planning process at both the local and state levels."' 3
The Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Devel-
opment Regulation Act384 specifies the procedure for public participa-
tion in the comprehensive planning process on the local governmental
level.3 8 Prior to enactment of the new property rights law, there was
no state-specified administrative process for a landowner to take issue
with a local government's decision not to grant a plan amendment
Section 4 of the legislation requires a local government to provide an
opportunity for mediation or other form of ADR when it denies an
owner's request for an amendment to the local comprehensive plan.8 6
The costs of the ADR will be shared equally by the local government
and the owner.3"7 If the owner requests mediation, the time for bring-
ing a judicial action will be tolled for 120 days or until completion of
the mediation, whichever is earlier. 8
The property rights law also creates a new ADR process available in
a compliance dispute between a landowner and the state land planning
agency, the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). 89 Under
existing law, the DCA is required to forward to the Division of Ad-
ministrative Hearings (DOAH) the agency's notice of intent to find a
local government's comprehensive plan amendment not in compliance
with state law.39 The DOAH then is required to conduct a formal
fact-finding hearing in accordance with section 120.57(1), Florida Sta-
tutes, with the parties specified to be the DCA, the local government,
and any affected person (such as the owner) who intervenes.*91
382. Id. § 70.51(2)(a).
383. Id. §§ 163.3181(4), .3184(10)(c).
384. Id. ch. 163, pt. I.
385. Id. § 163.3181.
386. Id. § 163.3181(4).
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. § 5.
390. Id. § 163.3184(10)(a).
391. Id.
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Section 5 requires the DCA to afford a prehearing opportunity to
mediate or otherwise resolve a dispute involving a notice of intent to
find a plan amendment not in compliance.39 If mediation is requested
by any party, the DCA must agree to mediation; the DOAH may not
conduct a hearing until the DCA has notified the hearing officer of
the results of the mediation.3 93 The hearing may not be delayed longer
than ninty days under this provision without the consent of the par-
ties.394 Mediation costs will be borne equally by all parties to the pro-
ceeding.39
The ADR provisions integrated into Chapter 163 by the property
rights law are general.396 Thus, local governments and the DCA have
broad latitude to choose, in conjunction with landowners and other
parties, the particular dispute resolution methods to be employed in
each case. This freedom should give parties to local planning disputes
the opportunity to develop case-specific dispute resolution processes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1995 property rights legislation was intended to adjust the bal-
ance between private interests and government in the continuing fric-
tion between regulators and landowners over the use of land in
Florida. It reflects both the popular mood and the shift in legislative
sentiment in recent years.
These new remedies are not radical departures from existing legal
doctrine. The Harris Act builds upon common law principles, consti-
tutional decisions, and the tradition of finding an accommodation be-
tween public and private interests. The Special Master Law and
related mediation provisions for the local planning program draw on
the field of ADR to seek remedies short of the expensive and frustrat-
ing process of litigation. Together, these efforts represent an attempt
to provide new and measured relief for landowners without undermin-
ing Florida's landmark environmental protection and growth manage-
ment laws.
392. Id. § 163.3184(10)(c).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. §§ 70.001, 70.51, 70.80, 163.3181(4), 163.3184(10)(c).
